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ABSTRACT
Essays on the Interaction Effects of Policies Across Jurisdictions
by
Ben J. Niu
Chair: James R. Hines, Jr.
This dissertation analyzes the theoretical and empirical effects of cross-border policy
dynamics, specifically state level bottle deposit-redemption systems and international corpo-
rate income taxation. As governments can only enact policies within their own jurisdictions,
borders often become areas with policy discontinuities. Mobility of economic factors al-
lows firms and consumers to take advantage/arbitrage across such divides. The presence of
borders therefore carries important positive and normative policy implications.
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of Michigan’s deposit-redemption system on Michigan as
well as Indiana and Ohio, two bordering states with no such policy. In conjunction with a
sales tax differential between the three states, households are theoretically able to fraudu-
lently redeem out-of-state bottles and evade use taxes via cross-border shopping. I hypoth-
esize that evidence of this behavior should be reflected in the patterns of retail prices for
xii
deposit eligible goods near these borders. Results from a simulated model of imperfect com-
petition and mobile households suggest that the main determinant of prices is travel costs.
I then empirically analyze an original dataset and find that retail prices are increasing and
decreasing with distance from the border in Indiana/Ohio and Michigan, respectively. At
the border, prices are generally higher on the Michigan side.
Chapters 2 and 3 analyze the strategic interactions between corporate income taxes of
countries that compete to attract mobile firms and capital. Specifically, I analyze the equilib-
rium revenue implications when competing countries offer preferential tax rates for targeted
tax bases. Chapter 2 uses numerical methods to generalize existing theoretical literature in
analyzing a less restrictive model of international tax competition. In the context of bilateral
tax agreements, I find that countries with greater productivity and population asymmetry
generate greater equilibrium revenues by allowing for preferential policies. Conversely, more
symmetric countries would do better by banning such policies. Chapter 3 focuses specifically
on the equilibrium revenue effect of cross-country profit correlation, i.e., the degree to which
firms generate the same profits across different countries. As profit correlation decreases,
preferential regimes become more revenue-dominant.
xiii
CHAPTER I
Retail Bottle Pricing at the Border:
Evidence of Fraudulent Redemptions and Use
Tax Evasion
1.1 Introduction
In 1971, Oregon became the first state to pass legislation approving the enactment of a
bottle deposit-redemption system. Colloquially known as “bottle bills”, state-level deposit-
redemption systems require consumers to pay an additional per-bottle fee on purchases of
items such as sodas and beers sold in bottles and cans.1 The deposit is then returned
to the consumer when the empty bottles are redeemed at approved redemption centers,
or via reverse vending machines (RVMs) located at larger retail locations. Because any
individual retailer may have more or less deposits than redemptions, distributors and/or
bottlers which operate on a larger geographic scale act as the financial intermediaries between
retailers and the state. These distributors collect the deposits taken in by their associated
retailers and then reimburse them for the outgoing redemptions. Originally, the bottle bill
1The usage of the word “bottles” refers generically to deposit-eligible beverage containers, and includes
plastic and glass bottles as well as aluminum cans.
1
was meant to curb littering as cheap gas, roadway expansions, and changes in product
packaging trends increased the amount of empty containers being thrown onto streets and
highways. Within ten years of its enactment, the percentage of roadside litter attributable
to soda and beer bottles decreased from 40% to 9%.2 Since then, California, Connecticut,
Hawaii, Iowa, Maine, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, and Vermont have all adopted
similar legislation.3 More recently, however, the motivation for bottle bills has shifted from
litter reduction to pro-recycling.
The deposit-redemption system was designed with the intent of being price neutral for
consumers so as to not effect their consumption decisions. However, the economic and behav-
ioral effects on consumers are far from neutral if we account for various redemption related
costs, e.g., storage, travel, and time requirements. Additionally, the policy discontinuities
created by these state-level laws generate arbitrage incentives for cross-border shopping. The
bottle bill also incentivizes households to fraudulently redeem bottles, i.e., collect deposits
on bottles for which none were paid. This is possible due to the fact that bottles are not
state-specific. RVMs and redemption centers cannot distinguish between those purchased in
Michigan, which paid the deposit, and those purchased out-of-state, which did not.
With the distinction of being the only state with a ten cent versus the common five
cent deposit, Michigan is the most prominent example of such arbitrage. It also shares
nearly 200 miles of land borders with its non-bottle bill neighbors, Indiana and Ohio. This
bottle bill wedge creates incentives for fraudulent redemptions on both sides of the border.
Michigan households can purchase in Indiana and avoid the deposit. If they also choose
to fraudulently redeem, this gives them another ten cents per bottle. Likewise, Indiana
2Littering numbers are from a 2004 report published by the Oregon Department of Environmental Quality.
3Delaware had a bottle bill but replaced it in 2010 with a state-wide curbside recycling policy. The
program is partially financed via a non-refundable deposit.
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households can fraudulently redeem their purchases in Michigan.
Concurrently, a sales tax wedge incentivizes households in the opposite direction. Michi-
gan levies a 6% sales tax while Indiana and Ohio have tax rates of 7% and 6.25%-7.75%,
respectively. An even larger difference exists for soda as Michigan exempts soda purchases
from all sales taxation. This tax wedge does two things. First, it dampens the effect of the
bottle bill wedge by making it more expensive, net of the tax, to make purchases in Indiana
and Ohio. Second, Indiana and Ohio households that make cross-border purchases at the
lower Michigan tax rate are legally obligated to remit the tax difference to their home states.
For example, an Indiana household that purchased $100 worth of beer in Michigan would
have paid an additional $6 in sales tax. Because Indiana has a higher 7% rate and would
have collected $7, the household owes the $1 difference in use taxes to Indiana. In practice,
however, most households do not pay this difference and are in fact committing tax evasion.4
While the presence of the bottle bill and sales tax wedges generates incentivizes for
cross-border purchases, fraudulent redemptions, and use tax evasion, no direct data exist to
confirm and/or quantify these illegal activities. Therefore, this paper indirectly analyzes this
hypothesis by studying the patterns of retail prices for deposit eligible goods near the borders
between Michigan and Indiana/Ohio. If arbitrage incentives do have a significant impact on
household behavior, then we would expect such effects to be capitalized in the retail prices.
By simulating a theoretical model of mobile households, and empirically analyzing an original
dataset of bottle prices, this paper looks to address two main questions. First, how do retail
prices adjust as a function of distance to/from the border in these three states? Second,
what is the magnitude of the border gap, assuming that one exists? As we move closer to
the border, the strength of these wedges and their effects on retail prices should increase.
4Internet sales are also an area with significant use tax evasion. As a result, a number of states have been
making a concerted push for increased support of the Streamlined Sales and Use Tax Agreement.
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We would therefore expect to see a price-distance trend in the pre-tax, pre-deposit prices
of bottled goods within each state. This would also suggest the presence of a sharp, price
discontinuity at the borders themselves.
The results from the model suggest that the bottle bill and tax wedges are functions
of the deposit amount, tax rates, and prices. More importantly, the relative sizes of each
wedge are largely influenced by the level of household mobility. High levels of household
mobility depress the overall level of retail prices in all states, which in turn decreases the
relative effect of tax differences. Therefore, low travel costs result in positive border gaps
and price-distance trends, i.e., Indiana/Ohio border prices are higher than Michigan border
prices with prices in both states increasing over distance. Under high travel costs, the results
flip. At intermediate levels of mobility, we see a combination of the two outcomes.
Empirically, I find that non-supermarket prices are generally increasing (decreasing) with
distance to the border in Indiana and Ohio (Michigan), respectively, when taking into account
other factors such as population, household income, and retail density. For example, I
estimate that a two liter bottle of Coke purchased from an Indiana retailer located 30 minutes
from the border is $0.20 more expensive than one purchased at the border. Conversely, the
price is $0.36 cheaper for the same distance comparison on the Michigan side. Relative to the
average price for two liter Cokes, this constitutes a difference of 12% and -21%, respectively.
In regards to the border gaps, Michigan’s non-supermarket (supermarket) border prices are
generally higher (lower) than those on the Indiana and Ohio sides. For example, I estimate a
border gap of -0.447 for the previous case. This implies that two liter Cokes on the Indiana
border are approximately $0.45 less than the same good sold adjacently on the Michigan
border. However, this reverses in the case of 24 packs of Bud Lite at the Ohio-Michigan
border where I estimate a positive border gap. Border retailers on the Ohio side are now
4
$1.04 more expensive than border retailers on the Michigan side. Given the estimated price
patterns, this points to the existence of cross-border shopping, fraudulent redemptions, and
use tax evasion. It also suggests that the effect of the bottle bill wedge is weaker relative to
the effect of the tax wedge.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 provides further background on
bottles bills, fraudulent redemptions, and relevant literature. Section 3 presents a theoretical
model of household and firm behavior that incorporates these two wedges. A numerical
simulation then generates predictions from the model. Section 4 describes the dataset and
presents the results of the empirical analysis. Lastly, Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Background
1.2.1 Michigan’s Bottle Bill
Bottle bills generally apply to beverages such as soda and beer that are sold in glass, plastic,
and aluminum containers. Deposits are five cents in all bottle bill states except for Michigan,
where it is ten cents, and California, where beverages larger than 24 fluid ounces are subject
to a ten cent deposit. Maine and Vermont also levy a 15 cent deposit on stronger alcohol.
Beverages sold out of the original container at venues are exempt from the deposit. In all
bottle bill states, save for California, the actual deposits are exempt from taxation. This
implies that the total purchase price of a $1.00 can of beer in Michigan is $1.16, with $0.06
coming from the 6% sales tax and $0.10 coming from the deposit. Indiana and Michigan
have sales tax rates of 7% and 6%, respectively. Ohio has a state sales tax rate of 5.5%
but the addition of local sales taxes pushes the total into the 6.25% to 7.75% range. Most
counties, however, are in the 6.75% to 7% range.
5
Bottles subject to a deposit are labeled as such near the UPC bar codes. The bar codes
also serve to confirm the eligibility of certain goods when they are redeemed. Most bottle
bill states allow for redemptions to occur via self-serve RVMs. RVMs are convenient because
they are found at almost all large retail locations such as supermarkets and big box stores,
and many times even at smaller retail locations such as pharmacies and convenience stores.
These bar codes, however, do not allow RVMs to identify the state from which the bottle
was purchased, i.e., bottles and bottle labels are identical across states. Therefore, RVMs
are unable to identify those bottles for which a deposit was paid.
Michigan’s bottle bill and its higher ten cent deposit are well known.5 These fraudu-
lent redemptions can be categorized into two types, although the law makes no distinction
between the two. In-state fraud is committed when a Michigan household purchases bot-
tles in Indiana or Ohio, where there is no bottle deposit, and redeems them in Michigan.
Out-of-state fraud is committed by Indiana or Ohio households who bring their out-of-state
bottles into Michigan. This does not, however, preclude Indiana households from redeeming
bottles purchased in Michigan if deposits were collected. However, a redemption can only be
claimed in the state from which it was purchased, i.e., a bottle purchased in Massachusetts
cannot be redeemed in Vermont even though both states have five cent deposits.
Geographically, the length of the border and the distribution of population in the three
states makes Michigan particularly vulnerable to cross-border shopping and fraudulent re-
demptions. In Michigan, there are two metropolitan statistical areas (MSAs) located near
the southern border, Monroe and Niles-Benton Harbor. The Monroe MSA is located at the
eastern-most side of the border (with Ohio) while the Niles-Benton Harbor MSA is located
5A plan to arbitrage between Michigan’s ten cent deposit and New York’s five cent deposit was the central
plot in two episodes (1996) of the television show Seinfeld. In order to generate positive profits in the venture,
the characters solved the travel cost dilemma by using a postal delivery truck.
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Figure 1.2.1: Map of Midwest
on the western-most side of the border (with Indiana). Monroe benefits from being the
intermediate point between the much more urban Detroit-Livonia-Wayne (MI) and Toledo
(OH) MSAs. Comparatively, Niles is a smaller city surrounded by rural areas, and Benton
Harbor leans heavily on Lake Michigan tourism. The more urban Michigan MSAs are lo-
cated further north, aligned almost perfectly along the east-west running Interstate 94. As
such, Michigan is generally characterized by a few smaller cities closer to the border with
larger cities further away. In Indiana and Ohio, there are two major MSAs located right
on the border, South Bend-Mishiwaka (IN) and Toledo (OH). Both are very urban areas
7
with significant stretches of suburban areas as well. Also on the Indiana-Michigan border
are the Elkhart-Goshen and Michigan City-La Porte MSAs. Elkhart and Goshen resemble
smaller versions of South Bend while Michigan City is somewhat similar to Benton Harbor.
It benefits from lake tourism but also acts as an intermediate manufacturing and shipping
point to Chicago. Other urban MSAs such as Indianapolis (IN) and Columbus (OH) are
much further south.
In all likelihood, some amount of fraud has always occurred in Michigan. It was not
a significant issue until the 1990’s and particularly in the 2000’s when annual redemption
rates consistently climbed above 94%.6 Comparatively, other bottle bill states were more
accustomed to seeing redemption rates in the 70%’s and 80%’s. While some of this difference
is certainly attributable to the higher deposit, the presence of fraudulent redemptions was
never more evident than in 1992 when Michigan’s redemption rate was 100.41%. In that
year, approximately 15 million additional bottles were redeemed. More recently in 2007,
Michigan State Police made a number of arrests as part of Operation Can Scam in which
a sophisticated network of individuals and business owners generated profits in excess of
$500,000. This criminal ring took bottles from Toledo, Ohio and sold them to retailers in
Detroit, Michigan who would then fraudulently redeem them in bulk. A 2009 state law, aimed
at curbing fraudulent redemptions, mandated that bottlers put an identifying Michigan mark
on bottles sold within the state. In 2011, the law was in the early stages of implementation
when a federal court struck it down.7
The monetary effects of fraudulent redemptions impact the state as well as the whole-
6Redemption rates are from a report published by the Michigan Department of Treasury in 2010.
7The US Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled in December 2011 that Michigan’s RVM Antifraud Act
violated the Commerce Clause in the case of American Beverage Association v. Snyder et al. By forcing an
identifying mark on bottles sold in Michigan, it was creating an extraterritorial effect on out-of-state bottlers
as well.
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salers/bottlers. When redemption rates are less than 100%, the unclaimed deposits or es-
cheat is split 75%/25% between the state of Michigan and the distributors. These state
funds typically go towards program costs as well as other environmental initiatives. Because
distributors aggregate the process across many retailers over a wide geographic area, they
bear a significant hassle cost to facilitating the bottle bill. Even though there are provisions
to reimburse distributors and retailers for these costs, such rates are fixed over time and
usually range between only one to three cents per bottle. Therefore, fraudulent redemptions
take money out of state coffers and introduce greater costs for distributors. Out-of-state
fraud also directly removes money from the state economy.
1.2.2 Previous Literature
The theoretical literature regarding deposit-redemption systems is sparse. Dobbs [1991] an-
alyzed a model which argued that in the case of littering, the optimal Pigouvian policy
includes both a consumption/disposal tax and an user fee. Intuitively, the consumption of
a good generates a number of social costs stemming from production externalities, littering
(eyesore and clean-up costs), and proper disposal (landfill, recycling process costs). Indi-
vidually, a consumption tax does not distinguish between littering and non-littering costs
because it is set at the marginal, total social cost. A consumer that does not litter therefore
still pays for the associated littering costs when it should in actuality only be assessed on
the proper disposal costs. Alternatively, a user fee for proper disposal does nothing to dis-
courage littering. Dobbs showed that having both taxes, with the user fee being a subsidy
that refunds the marginal social costs associated with littering, i.e., a deposit-redemption
system, generates the greatest welfare gains. Eggert and Weichenrieder [2004] also analyzed
the optimal mechanism question. Their paper claimed that deposit-refund systems are never
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optimal unless additional taxes are included to extract the surplus gained by producers. The
surplus is gained due to the assumption that producers can adjust prices in response to a
bottle bill, and claim some fraction of the escheat. The two papers differ primarily in regards
to assumptions on the level of market power and competition.8
More recent papers have empirically studied the behavioral aspects of bottle bills. Viscusi
et al. [2013] used survey data from a national sample of over 3000 bottled water consumers
to analyze how individual characteristics influence the likelihood to recycle with and with-
out a bottle deposit. They found that most households follow an all or nothing recycling
pattern with 45% always/fully recycling and 25% never recycling. After including a five cent
bottle deposit, these proportions changed to 62% and 8% for redeemers and non-redeemers,
respectively. From their survey data, they also found that the effect of a bottle deposit is
strongest for those with lower incomes. This is confirmed by Ashenmiller [2011] who found
that low income individuals derive a non-trivial amount of income via the bottle-redemption
system. Using responses from a survey of redeemers in Santa Barbara, CA, she estimated
that households earning less than $10,000 generated $340 annually, and $428 when limiting
the sample to Spanish-speaking households. Intuitively, the bottle bill acts as a mechanism
that sorts labor such that those with low wages efficiently redeem both their own and poten-
tially other consumer’s bottles. Ashenmiller [2010] analyzed a possible externality associated
with the supplemental income granted to low income individuals via bottle bills. Specifically,
she used the state-specific timing of bottle bill roll-outs to compare city-level petty crime
rates in states with and without bottle bills. On average, crime rates were 11% lower in
states with bottle bills which the author argues is due to the dampening effect of this added
income on incentives for criminal behavior.
8Additional papers on the topic include Fullerton and Wu [1998] and Fullerton and Wolverton [2000].
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Other papers have analyzed similar instances of cross-border arbitrage and smuggling.
Bhagwati and Hansen [1973] analyzed the incentives to circumvent tariff and tax laws, as well
as the welfare implications of such import/export smuggling. As with the topic discussed in
this paper, economic data that directly quantifies these illegal activities are either missing
or noisy. For example, soft smuggling techniques affect official export and import statistics
by under-reporting or mis-categorizing goods. Lovenheim [2008] examined the likelihood of
smokers to cross-border shop at lower priced/taxed jurisdictions using a survey of smokers’
behavior. He estimated that up to 25% of smokers cross-border shopped or purchased in
border locations because of price differences. Merriman [2010] also analyzed the degree of
cross-border shopping in the cigarette market. Using littering data in the highly tax stratified
Chicago area, he found that a one mile increase in distance to a low tax border increased the
probability of finding a littered “home” cigarette pack by one percent. Additionally, there is
a sizable border effects literature. The seminal paper, Engel and Rogers [1996], found that
price variation within countries is far lower than he price variation across countries, even
in the case of similar and close neighbors. They estimated that the US-Canadian border
generates a price differential equivalent to 75,000 miles of within-country distance.
To my knowledge there have not been any academic papers specifically studying the
effect of bottle bills and fraudulent redemptions on the spatial relationship between prices
and border.9 There has been, however, work on cross-border shopping and its relationship
with optimal local tax rates. Kanbur and Keen [1993] and Agrawal [2012] posited that local
jurisdictions adjust their local sales tax rates to account for differences in state sales tax
9One report in the late 1990’s, Analysis of Foreign Containers in the Michigan Deposit Stream, was
produced by a consulting group for the Michigan Beer and Wine Wholesalers Association in their push to
enact stricter anti-fraud legislation. This report used surveys of retailers to estimate that roughly $16 million
in redemptions came via fraud. A separate report commissioned by the state suggests that this number is
conflated due to biased sampling in a small region of the state.
11
rates when cross-border shopping is present. Whereas this paper hypothesizes that arbitrage
incentives would be capitalized in retail prices, this local sales tax literature hypothesizes
that it is capitalized in these local taxes. However, it is important to note that not all states
allow for separate local sales taxes including two of the three states studied in this paper.
1.3 Model
To model the behavior of households and firms, assume that the population is divided
amongst two states and four cities. Along the lines of a Hottelling model, the four equally
spaced cities are situated along a straight line such that Cities 1 and 2 are located in the
southern state, Indiana, while Cities 3 and 4 are located in the northern state, Michigan.
The distance between any two consecutively numbered cities is equal to one unit of distance.
The relevant variables in the model, all denoted in cents, are Vi (value of consumption),
cTi (marginal cost of travel), and c
R
i (marginal hassle cost of redeeming) for household i.
Households are heterogeneous in the sense that these three positive variables are distributed
according to FV , FT , and FR, respectively. Cities, however, are identical in the sense that the
distributions are not city specific. Additionally, all households receive new variable draws
each period.
In each period, households choose where to purchase the (non-durable) bottled good and
whether to redeem after observing the prices. Firms set profit maximizing prices in each of
the four cities, taking into account the mobility of households. This occurs in the context of
an infinitely repeated game.
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Figure 1.3.1: Hottelling Line
1.3.1 Households’ Problem
Households derive benefit Vi from the consumption of a homogenous, single-bottle good,
e.g., a two liter bottle of Coke, which lasts for the duration of a period. Expressed as the
monetary willingness to pay, Vi is household specific but not city specific. While households
are unable to change their city of residency, they can travel between cities at a marginal cost
of cTi cents per unit of distance (round trip). A household residing in City 1 therefore incurs a
travel cost of |j−1|cTi if it chooses to purchase in city j. These mobile consumers will decide
where to purchase the good by maximizing (minimizing) the total benefit (cost) associated
with each location. Let pj and τj denote the retail price and sales tax rate, respectively, in
city j. In the cases of Indiana and Michigan, there are no local sales taxes so τ1 = τ2 ≡ τInd
and τ3 = τ4 ≡ τMich. To simplify on notation, let p̂j be defined as the net-of-tax price in
city j. Due to Michigan’s bottle bill, all purchases made in Cities 3 and 4 are subject to
the deposit. As the good is comprised of a single bottle, ten cents is added to the net-of-tax
prices. Households do not have to purchase the good if the total benefit drops below zero.
Households must also decide whether or not to redeem the good. The benefit to redeeming
is the return value of the deposit. The cost of redeeming is captured by cRi .
10 Let cRi be the
10Assume that fraudulent redemptions do not result in any additional/special costs relative to legal re-
demptions.
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marginal hassle cost of redeeming a single bottle stemming from storage and RVM usage. For
households in Indiana that are not purchasing in Michigan, redeeming requires additional
travel across the border and thus an additional travel cost. For households in Indiana that
choose to purchase the good in Michigan, they are already incurring the travel cost so the
cost of redeeming is limited solely to the hassle cost. For households in Michigan, I assume
that the travel cost of redeeming is zero.11
As an example, consider the incentives of a household residing in Indiana.12 More specifi-
cally, household i in City 2 is contemplating purchasing at home or in City 3. If the household
chooses to not redeem, it will receive (1.3.1) and (1.3.2) in total benefit by purchasing at
home or purchasing in City 3, respectively.
Vi − (1 + τInd)p2 (1.3.1)
Vi − (1 + τMich)p3 − 10− cTi (1.3.2)
Absent redemptions, the household will purchase in the other cities and/or state if the po-
tential net-of-tax, net-of-deposit price savings exceed the travel costs. As would be expected,
households with lower marginal travel costs are more likely to purchase away from home. If
the household decides to redeem, its potential total benefit is amended by the net redemp-
tion term, 10 − cRi , plus an additional travel unit of travel cost, −cTi , if it was originally
purchasing at home. Unless an Indiana household is making purchases in City 4, assume
that all redemptions are made in the closest border city, City 3.
11Alternatively, RVMs are commonly found at retailers with the relatively largest sales and most customers,
we can assume that travel costs associated with redemptions are already captured by the purchase decision.
12The full set of household equations is given in Appendix A.
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Vi − (1 + τInd)p2 + 10− cRi − cTi (1.3.3)
Vi − (1 + τMich)p3 − cRi − cTi (1.3.4)
Comparing (1.3.3) and (1.3.4), we can see that the only difference lies in the net-of-tax,
net-of-deposit price. Given the 7% and 6% sales tax rates in the two states, City 2 can
support a higher price difference of at most:




and still be cheaper on net for its residents than City 3. For a per bottle price of 100 cents
on the Michigan border, this implies that the Indiana price can be approximately 8 cents
more. Fraudulent redemptions therefore have an obvious effect on the choice of purchase
location for those redeeming households. For non-redeeming households, the potential up-
charge is even greater since households would need to invest an additional unit of travel cost
to purchase in Michigan, i.e., this adds an additional cTi term to the numerator in (1.3.5).
For households residing in Michigan, the purchase-redemption choice is similar. All else
being equal, households have an incentive to purchase in Indiana due to the absence of the
deposit. To attract redeeming households in City 3, City 2 cannot support as high of a price
difference since the benefit of not paying the deposit is mitigated by the extra travel cost.
p2 − p3 ≤
10− 0.01p2 − cTi
1.06
(1.3.6)
Unlike in Indiana, notice that the redemption choice for Michigan households is independent
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of the location choice, i.e., (1.3.6) is the same for redeemers and non-redeemers alike. For
households in Indiana, the redemption choice is tied to the purchase location as location de-
termines whether or not a household incurs an additional travel cost. Households in Michigan
always redeem at home with no additional travel costs. What this implies is that the ability
to fraudulently redeem does not induce previously non-redeeming Michigan households to
redeem. Only redeeming Michigan households will be affected. Indiana households, on the
other hand, can be induced to purchase more at home and redeem.
To account for goods with multiple bottles/deposits, we can scale up the single bottle
analysis if we assume that the marginals, Vi, c
T
i , and c
R
i , are constant over different quantities.
Note that cTi becomes both the marginal and average travel cost associated with an additional
unit of bottle-distance. pj in this case would represent the average price of a bottle. Given
that the number of bottles per good is fixed, these assumptions imply that a household will
either buy or not buy the good, which avoids issues with partial purchases.
1.3.2 Firms’ Problem
On the firm side of the model, assume that there are a finite and fixed number of iden-
tical, zero cost retailers which sell the bottled good.13 Within each city, these retailers
collude/cooperate to set harmonized city-specific prices, pj ≥ 0, where prices are denoted
in one cent increments. Imperfect competition is crucial in this setting. The pre-tax, pre-
deposit prices would be identical across cities in a model of perfect competition. In the
context of this infinitely repeated game, assume that cities set their prices simultaneously
13This implicitly assumes that production/wholesale costs are the same across cities and states. This is
a simplification as there are differences. Per gallon of beer, Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio levy $0.12, $0.20,
and $0.18 in additional excise taxes applied at the bottler/wholesaler level. For a six pack of 12 ounce beer,
this corresponds with state excise taxes of approximately $0.07, $0.11, and $0.10, respectively. Figures are
from the Tax Foundation.
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each period. They can not, however, collude across cities or across different periods. I am,
in essence, analyzing a four firm oligopoly model of Bertrand competition. The level of anal-
ysis will therefore focus on the single period Nash Equilibrium prices across the four cities,
and the corresponding consumer behavior in the single period game. Each city’s revenue
maximizing price will be a function of the other cities’ endogenous prices and the exogenous
sales tax rates. The prices will also depend on the characteristics of the households in each
city as given by the three main variables. Assume that retailers set their prices prior to the
realizations of Vi, c
T
i , and c
R
i . Households make their purchase-redemption decisions under
full information while retailers know only of the distributions.
What would we expect the equilibrium prices to look like a priori? Consider a scenario
where there is no bottle bill and there are a large number of cities located beyond Cities 1
and 4. Far from the border, there would exist a prevailing equilibrium price, p̃, across the
cities. With a tax difference at the border, Cities 2 and 3 would charge different prices with
this effect dissipating with distance from the border. Prices on either side would asymptote
towards p̃ since higher (lower) border prices would pull up (down) prices in neighboring
cities. With the introduction of a bottle bill and fraudulent redemptions, p2 (p3) should rise
(fall). Again, the effect should dissipate away from the border. Overall, the direction of the
border discontinuity depends on the relative size of the tax wedge and the bottle bill wedge.
For cities far away from the border, there should be little to no effect.
1.3.3 Simulation Setup
To analyze the equilibrium price implications of this four city model, I numerically simulated
the model under a range of plausible parameter values.14 Each city has a population of 5000
14The model is solved numerically, as opposed to analytically, due to the severe tractability issues stemming
from the number of inequalities/cases and non-convexity of costs. The optimal local sales tax model in
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households. For each household, I draw values for Vi, c
T
i , and c
R
i from their respective distri-
butions. Fv, FT , and FR are assumed to be uniformly distributed and bounded from below
at zero. The maximum value of the good and willingness to pay, V̄ is fixed at 500 cents.15
For the marginal travel costs, I varied the upper bounds between c̄T ∈ {100, 150, 200}. This
range of moving costs typically generated intercity movements between 0% and 30%. Upper
bounds on the hassle cost of redemption were set at c̄R ∈ {11, 12, 13}. These numbers were
selected to generate a realistic range of redemption rates, 77%-91%, for Michigan households
that purchase the good.
Following the actual tax rates, τ was set at 7% for Cities 1 and 2, and 6% for Cities
3 and 4. The sales tax rates in Ohio range between 6.25%-7.75% due to the presence of
local sales taxes in addition to the state sales tax. On average, the combined sales tax rate
is approximately 7%. I also simulate a 7% and 0% sales tax scenario to model the case
of soda as it is exempt from taxation in Michigan. To break potential ties in cases where
households are indifferent between various scenarios, I introduced an additional term, θ,
which represents the ratio between the travel costs for purchases versus redeeming.16 In the
simulations, I assumed a θ of 1.01. Given a set of prices, households calculate the total benefit
for each purchase-redeem combination and select the most advantageous one. Multiplying
the number of households purchasing in city j by pj gives us the amount of revenue for city
j’s retailers.
For the retailers, the choice of pj depends on the characteristics of the households as
well as the prices in other cities. Recall that all firms within a given city collude but do
Agrawal [2012] gets around this issue by limiting consumers to purchase at most one city away which
drastically decreases the state space.
15This was selected ex post to generate equilibrium prices in the range of actual prices.
16For example, a household in City 2 would face the same travel costs if it purchased in City 1 and
redeemed in City 3, as it would if it purchased and redeemed in City 4.
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not collude across cities or periods. We are therefore interested in identifying the single
period Nash Equilibrium quartet of cities’ prices. To calculate the equilibrium prices, I used
an iteration method of best responses. Starting from a set of harmonized prices, each city
took turns re-optimizing their prices in response to the prices in the other cities. Moving
in sequential order, this continued until they reached a stable Nash/Bertrand Equilibrium
set of prices. Searching for an equilibrium in this manner guarantees stability and rules
out potentially unrealistic and unstable equilibria. These equilibria would also be trembling
hand perfect equilibria.
In a number of cases, however, existence was an issue, i.e., the iteration process failed
to converge. Instead, cities’ best responses looped or cycled amongst a closed set of prices.
To increase the likelihood of convergence, I included in the iteration process a 1% threshold
parameter. The threshold creates a range of inaction, i.e., sS policy, such that cities only re-
optimized if the new price generated a revenue increase equaling at least 1% of the current
revenues. We can interpret this threshold as an adjustment cost for changing the price.
Alternatively, it can reflect uncertainty/variability in the characteristics of the population
in the current period. Because retailers only know of the distributional characteristics of
each household, they may be loathe to make changes to the price unless there is sufficient
confidence of a positive revenue gain. The benefit to including a threshold parameter is that
it increases the likelihood of convergence. The tradeoff is that it also enlarges the set of
possible equilibria.17 A threshold of 1% was selected to balance between these two tradeoffs.
Additionally, I ran the iteration process with a range of different starting prices between 100
and 200 cents. Taking the average of such results provided a more informative picture of the
set of likely equilibrium prices and revenues.
17For every stable equilibrium, there may exist other Nash Equilibria where prices are only a cent off and
within the range of inaction.
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A potential issue with the four city model/setup lies in the fact that the outlying cities,
Cities 1 and 4, only face one city of contiguous competition whereas the inner cities face
two. This would allow Cities 1 and 4 to always support higher prices, and generate a price-
distance trend independent of the two wedges. One obvious solution would be to simply add
another set of cities beyond the end cities. With enough cities, the pulling up effect would
theoretically dissipate such that there would be negligible effects for those relevant cities
close to the border. Computationally, additional cities presents significant challenges given
the increases to the choice and state spaces.
Instead, I approximated this larger multi-city model by fixing the prices in Cities 1 and 4
such that only the two border cities can optimize their prices. Implicitly, this assumes that
the outlying cities are sufficiently far away from the border and unaffected by the various
border effects. The challenge lies in determining the appropriate fixed price that does not
artificially generate a price trend by assuming a very low or very high fixed price. The
correct price in this case is the prevailing equilibrium price, p̃, that would have occurred in
the multi-city model without the bottle bill for cities far from the border. To calculate p̃, I
simulate the four city model without the bottle bill while fixing p1 and p4 at some candidate
p and allowing p2 and p3 to react. If the candidate price is less than the true p̃, then the
resulting equilibrium p2 will be higher than p. If the candidate price is higher than the true
p̃, then p2 will be lower than p. The correct p that most closely approximates p̃ is the first
price after this flip occurs. Denote the fixed price p as p∗.
I therefore calculate p∗ for each of the different levels of households mobility. With
different tax rates in each state, 7% and 6%, there are two p̃ terms - one for each state -
and thus two separate fixed p∗ terms for p1 and p4. I calculate these by assuming that all
four cities have the same tax rate. Fixing p1 and p4, the correct p
∗ is the price where the
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equilibrium p2 and p3 are equal to p
∗. For the cases of 7%, 6%, and even 0% tax rates, the
calculated p∗ terms were all equal. This is likely due to the 1% threshold and, to a lesser
extent, the discrete prices. Only in one case were the p∗ terms different. Under a tax rate of
0% and c̄T = 200, p∗ was equal to 91 cents as opposed to 90 cents for the 7% and 6% cases.
For each of the tax and c̄T cases, I therefore simulate the model fixing p1 and p4 at the p
∗
which corresponds with the given distributional parameters. Notice that both the prevailing
price p̃ and p∗ are decreasing with household mobility.
1.3.4 Simulation Results
Define the border gap as the difference in price between City 2 and City 3, p2 − p3. The
price-distance trends in Indiana and Michigan are given by p1− p2 and p4− p3, respectively.
Table 1.1 presents the resulting equilibrium prices (in cents) when taxes rates are set at 7%
and 6%. The maximum hassle cost of redemption, c̄R, is set at 12 cents while the deposit is
ten cents.18
Table 1.1: Simulated Prices in Cents - 7% and 6% Taxes with c̄R = 12
c̄T p1 p2 p3 p4 Border Gap IN Trend MI Trend
100 55 47 67 55 -20 8 -12
150 74 72 102 74 -30 2 -28
200 90 92 134 90 -42 -2 -44
Figure 1.3.2 graphically presents a general representation of these results. Note that the
pictures are not drawn to scale. The signs of the border gaps and price-distance trends are
the main points of focus. The horizontal dotted line represents the prevailing price levels for
18The prices shown are averages of the equilibrium prices calculated under the different starting points.
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those hypothetical cities located far from the border. Recall that p1 and p4 are fixed at the
p̃.
In regards to the border gap, I find that the simulated equilibrium prices on the Indiana
border are lower than prices on the Michigan border in the three c̄T cases considered. In
regards to the price-distance trends, the Indiana trend flips from being positive to negative
when c̄T increases to 200. The Michigan trend is negative in this entire range. Overall, the
biggest determinant of the border gap and price-distance trends appeared to be the level of
household travel costs.
Figure 1.3.2: Border Gaps and Price-Distance Trends for Various c̄T
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Travel costs have a two-fold impact on the border gap. High travel costs depress the
bottle bill wedge by making it difficult for Indiana households to travel for redemptions. More
importantly, high travel costs increase the overall price levels in the cities. If households are
less mobile, then there is less intercity competition which allows for greater monopoly power
and a higher prevailing price level. The tax wedge increases in strength relative to the bottle
bill wedge as prices rise. This gives Michigan retailers an advantage over Indiana retailers
and results in a negative border gap. Conversely, lower travel costs push down overall price
levels. At lower prices, the effect of the tax wedge decreases relative to the bottle bill wedge.
When re-simulating under lower values of the travel cost parameter, I now find that the
border gap becomes positive for c̄T less than 15 as seen in Figure 1.3.2. At these lower travel
costs, we have the situation where not only is the travel cost for redemption smaller, but so is
the relative cost of buying in Indiana at a higher tax rate. Notice, however, that the border
gap when c̄T = 100 is negative even though a 1% tax difference is smaller than the deposit
at the calculated equilibrium prices. This indicates that additional factors, e.g., intercity
competition and stickiness of prices, play a role such that prices do not perfectly counteract
the net price difference.
From Table 1.3.2, we can see that Indiana’s price-distance trend flips at c̄T = 200. Michi-
gan’s trend is negative in all three cases. Re-simulating under lower levels of travel costs, I
find that Michigan also flips from negative to positive for c̄T ≤ 25. As discussed previously,
a low c̄T means that households are very mobile which increases the degree of price compe-
tition. Because competition is more pronounced at the border, prices for Cities 2 and 3 fall
below the prevailing at very low values of c̄T . Conversely, as c̄T increases and the population
as a whole becomes less mobile, intercity competition decreases and p̃ increases as is evident
from Table 1.3.2. Border prices are also increasing but they increase at a faster rate. This
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causes the price-trends to flip and become negative. Intuitively, when households become
more immobile, City 3 now has an advantage by being near City 2 as it faces weaker compe-
tition due to the bottle bill wedge. This allows City 3 to attract cross-border shoppers and
keep their domestic consumers. Michigan’s trend therefore flips from negative to positive as
c̄T increases. The higher levels of p3 also pull up p2 until both are above p̃ although this
occurs at a relatively higher c̄T .
Table 1.2: Simulation Results Summary
Positive for c̄T ≤ 15
Border Gap: p2 − p3 Gap increases with deposit
Gap decreases with τInd − τMich
Positive for c̄T ≤ 200
Indiana Trend: p1 − p2 Slope decreases with deposit
Slope increases (?) with τInd − τMich
Positive for c̄T ≤ 25
Michigan Trend: p4 − p3 Slope increases with deposit
Slope decreases with τInd − τMich
Table 1.2 summarizes the effect of c̄T on the border gap and price-distance trends. It also
summarizes the effect of different deposits and tax differentials. Switching from a ten cent
to an eight cent deposit decreases the border gap by approximately a cent under the three
previous mobility cases. As expected, a decrease in the deposit also increases (decreases)
the price-distance trend in Indiana (Michigan). Moving from the 7% and 6% case to the
7% and 0% case decreases the border gap by an average of five cents in the three cases. In
the simulations, the Michigan price-distance trend decreases for an increase in the gradient.
On the Indiana side, the price-distance trend increases with the gradient except in the case
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of c̄T = 200. This is due to the fact that the tax rates also affect prevailing price levels in
each state. Since we now have a direct price effect as well as an indirect tax competition
effect, there is less of a clear cut pattern. Most importantly, however, the level of household
mobility is still the main determinant of the price-distance trend.19
1.4 Empirical Analysis
The theoretical model generates a number of implications. Central to this paper is the
relationship between the states’ border prices as well as the correlation between intrastate
prices and distance from the border. To empirically analyze the actual price-distance trends,
the basic strategy is to regress the different pre-tax, pre-deposit retail prices of a bottled good
on the distance from the border for each corresponding retailer location. This regression
can be run separately for each state sub-sample, or over the entire sample but with state
interactions and fixed effects. For the border gaps, a similar approach can be used on
the Indiana-Michigan and Ohio-Michigan sub-samples. The coefficients of interest those on
the distance variable and state dummies. Below, I describe the dataset and the empirical
methodology.
1.4.1 Original Dataset of Retail Prices
Using the Google Maps and Yellow Pages websites, I created a list of convenience stores,
gas stations, grocery stores, liquor stores, pharmacies, and supermarkets within 150 miles of
19Given the model, it would be difficult to produce a reasonably justifiable estimate of the levels of
cross-border shopping, use tax evasion, and fraudulent redemptions that are occurring. While the empirical
analysis can motivate a range of household mobility with which to calibrate the model, the assumptions
needed to make such an estimation tractable outweigh the accuracy of such an estimate.
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the border.20 A smaller subset of specific stores was then selected to identify those retailers
from whom prices would be collected. Sampling wise, greater emphasis was placed on areas
closer to the borders and on retailers with relatively greater bottle sales, i.e., liquor stores,
grocery stores, and supermarkets. Otherwise, the selection of retailers was random.21 To
get a measure of distance to the border, I used Google Maps to calculate the routes with
the shortest driving times. As opposed to a straight line, “as the crow flies” distance, Google
Maps’ driving directions are a more realistic measure of effective distance. For each location,
I recorded the driving time in minutes and the corresponding distance in miles.22
Figure 1.4.1: Map of Retailers Sampled
20Existing UPC/scanner datasets focus predominantly on supermarket prices.
21See Appendix B for more details.
22Distance is calculated to the fastest drivable point on the border. Given the lack of available information
to systematically generate the most likely, nearest cross-border retailer, this is a second best alternative.
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The collection of retail prices was carried out via a combination of phone surveys and
in-store visits conducted between December 2012 and April 2013. At each location, the
following bottle pricing data were collected: the pre-tax and pre-deposit prices for a two
liter bottle of Coke, 12 pack of Coke in cans, six pack of Budweiser in bottles, and 24 pack
of Bud Lite in cans. Aside from the two liter Cokes, all other cans and bottles were of the
standard 12 ounce variety. In Ohio, smaller retailers sometimes charged a higher price for
cold versus warm 24 packs of Bud Lite, typically a dollar extra. In these cases, I collected
prices for the warm version. For each price observation, I noted if the given price was
marked as being on sale. Additional demographic and economic controls were obtained from
the US Census, specifically the American Community Survey (2011 - 5 Year) and the County
Business Patterns (2010). All of the Census variables were specified at the standardized ZIP
code level (ZCTA5). Analogous data at the city, town, and township levels were taken from
the website www.city-data.com.
In total, the dataset included 346 retailers. Driving distances ranged between 0 and 150
miles from the border while driving times ranged between 0 and 165 minutes. Column 5 in
Table 1.3 shows the number of retailers sampled by state. It also provides a breakdown of the
number of price observations for the four bottled goods. Due to the fact that not all retailers
carry the same sets of goods, there are fewer price observations than retailer observations. In
the case of soda, some stores did not stock any quantities larger than six packs while others
only sold Pepsi products. In the case of beer, a number of stores, particularly pharmacies,
either did not sell Bud Lite in quantities larger than 15 packs or did not sell any alcohol
period. Additionally, the number of price observations denoted as being on sale is given in
parentheses.
27
Table 1.3: Count of Observations (# Sales)
2 Liter Coke 12 Pack Coke 6 Pack Bud 24 Pack BudLite Retail Obs
Indiana 99 (29) 92 (26) 49 (2) 70 (25) 110
Michigan 108 (30) 91 (31) 97 (0) 105 (24) 126
Ohio 86 (20) 81 (22) 77 (0) 91 (12) 110
Total 293 (79) 264 (79) 223 (2) 266 (61) 346
The choice of these specific goods was purposely made to address a number of key points.
I selected major brands in commonly sold quantities to facilitate greater comparability by
mitigating potential issues with missing observations. As is evident, the bundle varied along
the two dimensions of quantity and beverage type. By selecting four products with different
numbers of bottles/deposits per good, I can analyze potential effect differences stemming
from the number of deposits. In the model, the number of bottles does not affect households’
decisions because it was assumed that all relevant marginal benefits and costs were constant.
However, we may still see a differentiated effect on the 24 pack as compared to the 12 pack
given differences in the price to deposit ratios. There may also be non-modeled behavioral
effects, e.g., the salience of a $2.40 versus $1.20 redemption potential. The bundle was
also designed to tease out the differing tax difference effect between sodas and beer. As
previously discussed, Michigan exempts soda from taxation while Indiana and Ohio do not.
Beer is taxed in all three states.23
Table 1.4 provides summary statistics on pre-tax and pre-deposit retail prices across the
23The price of an 11 ounce bag of Doritos was originally collected for usage as a control good. It is dropped
due to a lack of variation in prices (suggested retail price printed on each bag), and a near perfect correlation
between being on sale and retail type. The control therefore generated no additional predictive power in
describing the impact of distance on prices. Gum was also considered as a potential control but Indiana
state laws prohibit the sale of gum in liquor stores.
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three states. Note that prices in the empirical section are denoted in dollars, not cents.
Most importantly, we can see that there is variation in the prices. This variation is fairly
consistent across the three states. The lone exception is the case of 24 packs in Ohio where
the spread is much smaller.
Table 1.4: Summary of Pre-Tax and Pre-Deposit Retail Prices ($)
Prices ($) 2 Liter Coke 12 Pack Coke 6 Pack Bud 24 Pack BudLite
Indiana
Mean 1.66 4.66 6.12 16.91
S. Deviation 0.36 0.91 0.51 2.02
Range [1, 2.49] [2.50, 5.99] [5.47, 7.50] [14.99, 24.91]
Michigan
Mean 1.78 4.81 6.46 17.53
S. Deviation 0.37 0.94 0.58 1.74
Range [1, 2.49] [3.33, 6.99] [5.19, 8.99] [14.99, 22.99]
Ohio
Mean 1.73 4.57 6.23 18.07
S. Deviation 0.30 0.98 0.48 0.58
Range [1.18, 2.29] [3, 6.98] [5.19, 9.10] [14.99, 19.99]
Avg. Per Bottle Price 1.72 0.39 1.05 0.73
29
1.4.2 Empirical Design
To estimate the price-distance trends, I use the specification given by (1.4.1). Equation
(1.4.1) is run separately for each state sub-sample to estimate the price-distance trends in
the three states. With four goods and three states, this gives us a total of 12 regressions. This
specification looks specifically at the differential price-distance trend between supermarkets
and non-supermarkets for reasons to be discussed below. The coefficients of interest are
therefore β1 and β3. β1 is the price change in cents for a 1% increase in driving time while β3
is the differential price change for supermarkets. The effect of distance on prices is therefore
given by β1 and β1 + β3 for non-supermarkets and supermarkets, respectively.
pi = β0 + β1lnminutesi + β2spmkti + β3lnminutesi ∗ spmkti + β4Xi
+β5salei + β6monthi
(1.4.1)
pi: pre-tax, pre-deposit retail price Xi: vector of controls
lnminutesi: log driving time (min) salei: on sale dummy
spmkti: supermarket dummy monthi: categorical month dummy
In (1.4.1), the dependent variable is the pre-tax, pre-deposit retail price of the bottled
good at given retail location i. The central independent variable, lnminutesi, is the measure
of driving time from retailer i to the Michigan border in minutes. Recall that this was
calculated using Google Maps. As opposed to driving distance, driving time takes into
account differences in the rate of travel as well as abstracting away from potential geographic
differences in fuel efficiency and/or costs.24 Therefore, “distance” will always refer to the
driving time in minutes. Due to the distribution and range of driving times in the sample,
24The mean minutes-mile difference is fairly small at 1.78 minutes/miles.
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I use log minutes in the specifications. This is also appropriate given the asymptotic, non-
linear behavior in the model.25
I categorize retailers into convenience stores (includes gas stations), grocery stores, liquor
stores, pharmacies, and supermarkets. While liquor stores and pharmacies are fairly straight-
forward to categorize the other three have subtler, more subjective distinctions. I define
convenience stores, e.g., 7-Elevens and Speedways, to be those establishments that sold a va-
riety of pre-packaged foods but no fresh produce. Those that did sell produce were classified
as grocery stores. To be classified as a supermarket, retailers need to satisfy two require-
ments. First, they need to sell an expanded selection of foods, e.g., bakery, deli, seafood,
etc. Second, the retailer must have at least five chain locations. In these three states, the
main and biggest supermarket chains are Meijer, Kroger, and (Super) Wal-Mart. Separating
retailers into categories and interacting each with distance allows for systemic differences
in price-distance trends. Using the full range of retail categories, however, greatly reduces
the power. I therefore use the spmkti dummy which separates retailers into supermarkets
and non-supermarkets. Supermarket chains tend to follow centralized pricing strategies as
evidenced by the homogeneity of advertisements over large geographic areas. We therefore
expect them to be less reactive over distance. Separating out this group better allows us to
identify a pricing pattern amongst those retailers most likely to have a price-distance trend.
Xi is a vector of logged demographic and economic controls including population, median
household income, median home value, population density, and retail establishment density
(proxy for the level of economic activity and firm competition). Retail establishment, in
this case, refers to the broader Census definition of retailers and is not specific to vendors
of bottled goods. All controls are defined at the standardized zip code level. These controls
25The price-distance trends are linear in the simulation results because there are only two cities on either
side. With more cities per state, I would expect prices to asymptote towards p̃ on either side.
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are meant to account for price patterns caused by concurrent changes in demand and supply
conditions. For example, if towns closer to the Michigan border are typically smaller, have
fewer stores, and exhibit greater monopoly power, then not accounting for this fact would
result in negatively biased estimates of the distance coefficient. For Ohio, I also include the
combined local and state sales tax rates.
The salei term is a dummy indicating whether a given price observation was marked as
being on sale. Note that being marked as on sale does not necessarily mean that a given price
is in fact on sale, i.e., selling below trend. If a retailer routinely offers the same sale price
then it is effectively not on sale.26 Absent pricing data over time, I am unable to determine
the true nature of a given price. This is an issue if, for example, the proportion of true sales
to recurring sales is systemically smaller at the border. Regressing with the salei term would
underestimate the price level at the border and negatively bias the price-distance trend and
vice versa if the opposite were true. Therefore, I include results from regressions with and
without the salesi term. The “true” estimate is likely to be somewhere in between. Lastly,
the monthi term controls for seasonal factors.
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pi = γ0 + γ1lnminutesi + γ2spmkti + γ3michi + γ4lnminutesi ∗ spmkti
+γ5lnminutesi ∗mich+ γ6spmkt ∗mich+ γ7lnminutesi
∗spmkti ∗michi + γ8Xi + γ9salei + γ10monthi
(1.4.2)
To estimate the border gap, I use the specification given by (1.4.2). Unlike (1.4.1),
26A related example is the strategy of the home goods retailer Bed, Bath, and Beyond which consistently
sends out 20% off coupons. A majority of consumers therefore pay 80% of the listed retail prices even though
they are technically paying a discounted amount.
27A differential test of weekend versus weekday was statistically insignificant.
32
(1.4.2) is run separately for the Indiana-Michigan and Ohio-Michigan sub-samples. In these
two cases, the Michigan sample is divided into Western (Indiana side) and Eastern (Ohio
side) Michigan. The Indiana-Ohio border is located almost exactly halfway along Michigan’s
southern border. Drawing a line straight north from the border provides a cutoff to delineate
the two sub-samples. With four goods and two borders, this gives us eight regressions. In
the same vein as (1.4.1), (1.4.2) interacts lnminutesi and spmkti. It also interacts michi, a
Michigan dummy. This triple interaction, along with the corresponding dual interactions and
main effects, allows us to concisely capture the magnitude of the border gap. The coefficients
of interest in this case are γ3 and γ3 + γ6 which represent the estimated non-supermarket
and supermarket border gaps for Michigan and Indiana/Ohio.28
1.4.3 Price-Distance Trends
Tables 1.11 - 1.14 present regression results from (1.4.1), which isolated for a differential effect
between supermarkets and non-supermarkets. The non-supermarket price-distance trend is
given by the coefficient on lnminutesi, i.e., β1. For supermarkets, the price-distance trend is
given by the sum of β1 and β3, the coefficient on the interaction term lnminutesi ∗ spmkti.
Tables 1.5 and 1.6 condense and highlight the pertinent estimates from each regression.
Let us first consider the non-supermarket prices. Aside from six packs of Budweiser in
Ohio, the general price-distance trends are negative in Michigan and positive in Indiana and
Ohio. This implies that prices are decreasing with distance from the border in Michigan,
but increasing with distance in Indiana and Ohio. These price-distance trends suggest that
we are in the intermediate range of household mobility - see Figure 1.3.2.
28We can also compare price-distance trend estimates between the two specifications. Estimates are fairly
consistent.
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Table 1.5: Price-Distance Coefficients for Non-Supermarkets
Non-Spmkts Michigan Indiana Ohio
No Sales
2L Coke -0.058∗ 0.059∗∗ 0.044∗
12 Coke -0.087 0.056 0.219∗∗
6 Bud -0.025 0.104∗∗ -0.093∗
24 BudLite -0.280∗∗ 0.049 0.138∗∗∗
With Sales
2L Coke -0.048 0.068∗∗∗ 0.058∗∗∗
12 Coke -0.109 0.030 0.154∗∗
6 Bud -0.025 0.107∗∗ -0.093∗
24 BudLite -0.241∗ 0.043 0.152∗∗∗
In comparing the coefficients from the sales and no-sales regressions, we see that the
inclusion of the salei term does not consistently shift the price-distance trend up or down.
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Comparing effects across the different products, we see that going from a good with fewer
deposits to a good with more deposits (within the two types) decreases the coefficients in
Michigan and Indiana but increases the coefficients in Ohio for the non-supermarket prices.
The simulation results suggested that an increase in the deposit would increase and decrease
the price-trend in Michigan and Indiana, respectively. In this case, only Indiana follows the
predicted pattern. While the supermarket coefficients seem to fit the model’s predictions
29Table 1.10 shows the estimated marginal effects from a probit regression which looks at the probability
of seeing a sale as a function of distance. Sales tend to be less prevalent closer to the border for two liters
of Coke and 24 packs of Bud Lite, and more prevalent for 12 packs of Coke. There does appear to be a
relationship between the two but R2 values between 0.20-0.30 suggest that collinearity is not a significant
issue.
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more so than the non-supermarket prices, overall it seems that this prediction does not hold.
However, it is unclear whether or not this comparison should be made since only the per
unit price to deposit ratios are increasing, and not the actual deposit. Likewise, comparisons
between sodas and beers are tenuous due to differences in the number of bottle deposits.30
Table 1.6: Price-Distance Coefficients for Supermarkets
Spmkts Michigan Indiana Ohio
No Sales
2L Coke -0.064∗∗ 0.034 0.030
12 Coke 0.184∗∗ -0.424∗∗∗ 0.014
6 Bud 0.155 0.025 -0.154
24 BudLite 0.080 -0.320 0.088
With Sales
2L Coke 0.033 0.014 0.032
12 Coke 0.314∗∗∗ -0.235∗∗ 0.086
6 Bud 0.155 0.026 -0.154
24 BudLite 0.364 -0.270 0.103
If we compare effects between supermarkets and non-supermarkets, we confirm that su-
permarket prices tend to react less with distance from the border than non-supermarkets.
This is true for all goods except 12 packs of Coke. In Ohio, all estimates are insignificant.
If we include sales in the regressions, the estimates are insignificant in all but two cases,
again for 12 packs of Coke. As discussed previously, the non-responsiveness of supermarket
30A better comparison may have been possible if I had collected data on soda and beer products with
equal deposits, e.g., a six pack of Coke versus a six pack of Budweiser. However, single bottles of beer, six
packs of soda, and 24 packs of soda are not commonly found.
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prices over distance is likely due to the larger, retail chain nature of these stores. The pop-
ularity of these four products guarantees that they are almost always advertised and/or on
sale. Because the same weekly advertisements go out for all stores within a given region,
this hinders the ability of individual stores to tailor pricing decisions at individual loca-
tions. It may also limit such behavior to the pricing of less popular and/or regional items.
Non-supermarkets, in particular non-chain retailers, may be more decentralized and better
able to adjust to location specific factors.31 This is very true in the case of the big three
supermarket chains, Kroger, Meijer, and Wal-Mart, where differences in advertised prices
only exist across different (large) regions. It is also possible that supermarkets are more
competitive than non-supermarkets. If this were true, then we would also expect to see less
of a price-distance reaction.
Since the Michigan sample includes retailers near both borders, it is possible that the
Michigan regressions are aggregating two statistically different price-distance responses. If
Indiana and Ohio are the same, then this is not an issue. However, if Indiana and Ohio, or
East and West Michigan are different, then this aggregation could be clouding the results.
To test this possibility, Table 1.7 summarizes estimates from separate regressions on the
two Michigan sub-samples. Specifically, I divide up the Michigan sample into those in East
versus West Michigan. The north-south, Indiana-Ohio break coincides with the county
boundaries in Michigan. Comparing the two sub-samples, we see that differences between
the coefficients are only statistically significant for two liter of Cokes (non-supermarket with
sales) and 24 packs of Bud Lite (all). In comparison with the estimates from Tables 1.5
and 1.6, the largest change occurs in the non-supermarket Bud Lite regressions. Previously,
the combined Michigan sample generated an estimate of -0.280 and -0.241 for the no sale
31Using a chaini dummy instead of spmkti produces less statistically significant estimates.
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and sale regressions, respectively. With the split sample, West Michigan has a negative
estimate while East Michigan has a positive estimate. For the supermarket prices, there are
some differences in sign although these differences only occur where there is no statistical
significance.
Table 1.7: East Versus West Michigan
Non-Supermarkets Supermarkets
No Sales West Mich East Mich West Mich East Mich
2L Coke -0.106∗∗ 0.013 -0.087 -0.050
12 Coke -0.114 -0.066 0.273∗ 0.134
6 Bud -0.039 -0.140 0.101 -0.042
24 BudLite -0.584∗∗ 0.684 0.079 -0.063
With Sales
2L Coke -0.075∗ 0.005 0.103 -0.007
12 Coke -0.205 -0.038 0.365∗∗∗ 0.295∗∗∗
6 Bud -0.039 -0.140 0.101 -0.042
24 BudLite -0.542∗∗ 0.815∗ 0.416∗ 0.332
There are two plausible explanations for this disparity between the non-supermarket
price-distance trends. First, there could be a significant difference in the characteristics
of households between the Indiana and Ohio sides. For example, households in the west
could be less mobile than households in the east, which the simulated model shows could
indeed flip the signs. There could also be differences in household preferences/demand due
to the economic profile of border regions in the two sides. As previously discussed, West
Michigan is fairly rural near the border with some tourism based towns surrounding Lake
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Michigan. The negative coefficient in Indiana could be driven by a higher willingness to pay
in West Michigan due to the presence of wealthier non-resident tourists whose (transient)
incomes would not be captured by the controls. Second, these results could also be caused
by differences in alcohol laws between Indiana and Ohio. Specifically, Indiana bans the sale
of carry-out beer on Sundays from all retail establishments. Given the close proximity of
the South Bend area to the Indiana-Michigan border, this Sunday ban may push greater
demand into Michigan. This additional wedge would support the decreasing price-distance
trend because Michigan stores close to the border could exploit their Sunday monopoly.
Ohio also has alcohol laws although these tend to cover hard alcohol sales rather than beer
sales. Additionally, these laws are set at the local level where they are primarily found in
rural towns further from the border. Due to the fact that the two liter Cokes also exhibit
this pattern, albeit at a much weaker level, it is likely that the true explanation involves a
combination of these two explanations.
1.4.4 Border Gaps
Given the estimated price-distance trends and the results from the simulated model, we
would expect to see a negative border gap, i.e., Indiana and Ohio’s border prices being lower
than Michigan’s border prices. We can verify this by looking at Tables 1.17 and 1.18 which
present estimation results from specification (1.4.2). Recall that these regressions include
interactions between lnminutesi, spmkti, and a Michigan dummy, michi. Running this
specification over the combined Indiana and Michigan (West/Indiana side), and Ohio and
Michigan (East/Ohio side) samples gives us a straightforward way to quantify the border
gaps. Our estimates of interest are γ3, the coefficient on the Michigan dummy, and γ6,
the coefficient on the interaction between the Michigan and supermarket dummies. γ3 is
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the non-supermarket, border price difference between Michigan and Indiana/Ohio while γ6
is the additional supermarket price difference. The border gaps for non-supermarkets and
supermarkets are therefore given by −γ3 and −(γ3 + γ6), respectively. Technically, these are
the border price differentials when lnminutesi is equal to zero, i.e., when the driving time is
equal to one minute.32
Table 1.8: Border Gap Coefficients
Non-Supermarkets Supermarkets
No Sales Ind-Mich Ohio-Mich Ind-Mich Ohio-Mich
2L Coke -0.447∗∗∗ -0.184 -0.659∗∗ -0.255
12 Coke -0.580 -0.341 1.677∗∗ 0.858∗
6 Bud -0.230 -0.762 0.290 0.384
24 BudLite -1.667∗ 1.038 0.854 0.746
With Sales
2L Coke -0.374∗∗ -0.133 0.081 -0.199
12 Coke -0.672 -0.409 1.718∗∗ 0.920∗∗
6 Bud -0.247 -0.762 0.280 0.384
24 BudLite -1.569 1.229∗ 1.987 1.111∗∗
Table 1.8 summarizes the border gap estimates from these regressions as well as regres-
sions without the salei term. Notice that in all cases, except for 24 packs of Bud Lite at the
Ohio-Michigan border, the border gap is negative, i.e., the Michigan prices are higher at the
border. The -0.374 border gap estimate for two liters implies that Indiana non-supermarkets
32Depending on the relative steepness of the price-distance trends, these estimates could be greater or less
than the true border gaps because we are measuring the difference at one minute of driving time. However,
these estimates are not likely to be far from the true border gap.
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on the border are on average 37 cents cheaper than their Michigan counterparts. Similar to
the pattern found in the price-distance trend regressions, these results are consistent with
household mobility being in the intermediate range - see Figure 1.3.2. However, only the
estimates for the two liter Cokes and the 24 pack of Bud Lite (sales only) are significant.
In regards to the supermarket border gaps, notice that most, with the exception of two
liter Cokes, are now positive, i.e., border prices in Indiana and Ohio are greater than border
prices in Michigan. From the price-distance trend regressions, we saw that supermarkets are
typically less responsive within each state due to the more centralized, chain pricing strate-
gies. However, this is less true across states as the big three offer different advertisements
and/or sales between states and even larger regions such as East and West Michigan. Addi-
tionally, there exists a number of more regional supermarket chains, e.g., Martin’s Supermar-
kets in Indiana, Chief and Giant Eagle Supermarkets in Ohio, and Harding’s Supermarket
in West Michigan, that service the border areas in these three states. Like the big three,
their prices are constant from store to store. Due to their slightly higher prices (relative to
the big three) and their regional nature near the border, these smaller supermarkets make
it look as if supermarkets as a whole are more expensive near the border. Thus, we see a
number of these positive border gaps in the supermarket category. If we redefine the spmkti
term to exclude these smaller supermarkets, then these coefficients decrease in both magni-
tude and significance. For example, the $1.68 border gap for the 12 packs of Coke on the
Indiana-Michigan border is no longer significant. On the non-supermarket side, the addition
of these stores shrinks the border gap from -$0.45 to -$0.16 with both being significant.
The exceptions to these general trends are the non-supermarkets prices of 24 packs and
the supermarket prices of two liter Cokes. However, it makes intuitive sense that the 24
pack would have a positive border gap due to its relatively high number of deposits, low
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price-to-deposit ratio, and small tax differential. We would expect the bottle bill wedge to
be strongest for this good. Likewise for two liters of Cokes in supermarkets, the good with
the lowest deposit, highest price-to-deposit ratio, and highest tax differential has a negative
gap.
While the border gaps in the non-supermarket regressions tend to match with the model
predictions (given the price-distance trends), we only find limited significance. This could
be an issue related to the sample size. It could also be an issue with noise and/or mis-
measurement in the data, e.g., the indeterminate nature of the salei term. Alternatively,
it is possible that −γ3 and −(γ3 + γ6) are not our estimates of interest. For a consumer
interested in cross-border shopping, the price - not the price differential conditional on being
a supermarket or non-supermarket - is the parameter of interest. The model assumed that
retailers’ locations were exogenously given. This did not matter in terms of the simulation
results as all firms were assumed identical. In reality, however, retailers are not identical and
the location choice of a given retailer/retail type is endogenous. This suggests that it may be
appropriate to not control for retail type. The same argument could be made for excluding
the salei term if we believe that households can time their purchases to coincide with these
sales.
Similar to the argument for splitting Michigan into East and West Michigan, specification
(1.4.2) also looks to identify estimates of the border gap across the entirety of the Indiana-
Michigan and Ohio-Michigan borders. It is plausible to believe that such a discontinuity may
be more readily apparent if we examine specific areas with greater economic activity, traffic,
and retailers. Specification (1.4.3) therefore presents an alternative strategy to search for
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price discontinuities at the two specific borders near Toledo, Ohio and South Bend, Indiana.
pi = δ0 + δ1closei + δ2michi + δ3closei ∗michi + δ4lnminutesi ∗ (1− closei)
+δ5lnminutesi ∗mich ∗ (1− closei) + δ̄6Xi + δ7salei
(1.4.3)
For the Toledo border, the sample is limited to observations from the counties of Lucas (OH)
and Monroe (MI). For the South Bend border, the sample is limited to observations from
the counties of Elkhart (IN), La Porte (IN), St. Joseph (IN), Berrien (MI), and Cass (MI).
The variable closei is a dummy which equals one if the retailer is five minutes or closer to the
border and zero otherwise. This specification differs from the previous specifications in that
it aggregates prices within this five minutes range, i.e., it assumes that prices do not react
substantially with respect to distance in this narrow time range. Only for locations further
away do we introduce the lnminutesi term. Additionally, I no longer distinguish between
supermarkets and non-supermarkets. Due to the sample size, only controls for logged median
household income, population density, and retail establishment density are included. The
border gaps are therefore given by − (δ2 + δ3).
Table 1.9: Summary Table of Border Gap Coefficients - Combined
All Retailers South Bend, IN Toledo, OH
With Sales
2L Coke -0.333∗∗∗ -0.171
12 Coke 1.081∗∗∗ -0.766∗
6 Bud -0.851∗∗ -0.059
24 BudLite -1.213 1.168∗∗∗
Tables 1.19 and 1.20 present the regression results for these two border cases with border
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gap estimates shown in the bottom two rows. Table 1.9 summarizes these estimates. In
comparison to the border gaps from the previous specification, we see that the estimates
are more significant. This does suggest that the impact of the bottle bill and tax wedges
are likely to be more focused at these concentrated areas. Combining supermarkets and
non-supermarkets also means that the estimated border gaps are sandwiched in between the
border gaps from Table 1.8. They are typically closer to the non-supermarket estimates due
to the greater number of non-supermarket observations.
1.4.5 Sensitivity Analysis
To test the sensitivity of the price-trend results from the different specifications, I also ran
the regressions with city level controls instead of zip code level controls, which generated
negligible differences.33 This also occurred when using logged driving distances instead of
logged driving times. Because the number of clusters is less than 50 in the single state
regressions, I also re-calculated the standard errors using wild bootstraps as suggested by
Cameron et al. [2008].34 This generated mixed effects as errors decreased for some coefficients
while they increased in others.
1.5 Conclusion
This paper analyzed the capitalization of a bottle bill and tax wedge in the patterns of retail
bottle prices near the borders of Indiana, Michigan, and Ohio using both a theoretical model
and empirical analysis of an original dataset. By quantifying the price-distance trends and
33I did not have retail establishment data at the city level but did include a control for the number of
supermarkets and club membership stores within city boundaries.
34Typically, clustering improves standard errors but may be detrimental if there are fewer than 50 clusters.
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border gaps in these three states, I indirectly identified evidence of cross-border shopping,
fraudulent redemptions, and use tax evasion by households.
From a simulated model of imperfect intercity and interstate price competition, I gener-
ated predictions on the patterns of equilibrium prices and the relative strengths between the
two wedges. The findings from the model suggest that the degree of household mobility is the
main determinant of both the price-distance trends and border gaps. High levels of mobility
result in lower equilibrium prices, particularly at the borders where competition is the most
intense. At these low prices, a percentage tax difference is also weaker in strength relative
to the deposit. Thus, price-distance trends are positive while the border gap is negative. As
travel costs increase, these results flip.
Using an original dataset of retail prices, I then tested the implications of the model by
empirically quantifying these border gaps and price-distance trends for four bottled goods.
In general, the empirical results were consistent across the different specifications. Near the
Indiana-Michigan border, the non-supermarket price-distance trends for two liters of Coke
were estimated to be 0.059 and -0.106, respectively. Given an average price of $1.72 for the
Cokes, these estimates imply that prices at non-supermarkets located 30 minutes from the
border are $0.20 more expensive and $0.36 cheaper for Indiana and Michigan, respectively.
Overall, non-supermarket prices in Indiana and Ohio tend to increase with distance from
the border whereas prices in Michigan tend to decrease with distance from the border.
Supermarket price-trends are less significant and smaller in magnitude with the exception
of 12 packs of Coke. This result coincides with the homogeneity of advertised prices across
their chain stores.
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Figure 1.5.1: Non-Supermarket 2L Coke Price Trends and Gap (IN-MI Border)
Note: Price levels are normalized at $1.50 for the Indiana border. Covariates are fixed at all distances.
Given the estimated price-distance trends, the estimated border gaps matched up well
with the predictions of the model. In general, Michigan’s border prices were found to be
higher (lower) than those of non-supermarkets (supermarkets) in Indiana and Ohio. This
suggests that the effect of the bottle bill wedge is weaker relative to the tax wedge. Returning
to the two liter Coke example, I estimated a -$0.45 border gap. Given that the 7% sales
tax difference between the two states generates an average tax hit of approximately $0.11,
whereas purchasing in Indiana saves only $0.10 via the deposit, it appears that retail prices
are reacting more to the tax wedge. Likewise, I estimated a border gap of -$1.67 for 24 packs
of Bud Lite. This produces a picture similar to Figure 1.5.1. However, the same border gap
was estimated to be $1.04 on the Ohio-Michigan border. In this case, the positive border gap
indicates that the bottle bill wedge, particularly for high deposit and/or low price-to-deposit
ratio goods, can dominate the tax wedge. It also highlights the presence of additional factors,
e.g., Indiana’s Sunday alcohol ban.
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Figure 1.5.2: Non-Supermarket 24 BudLite Price Trends and Gap (OH-MI Border)
Note: Price levels are normalized at $16.00 for the Ohio border. Covariates are fixed at all distances.
Overall, the results indirectly suggest the presence of cross-border shopping, fraudulent
redemptions, and use tax evasion. Given the estimated border gaps and price-distance
trends, prices reflect a greater impact from the tax differential and use tax evasion. Note,
however, that this does not indicate the absence of cross-border shopping and/or fraudulent
redemptions, only the relative nature and capitalization of such behavior in the retail prices.
Given the lack of direct data, this indirect empirical approach is a feasible strategy for
identifying and quantifying the relative strengths of these illegal activities. We can also apply
this methodology to other state borders such as Maine which has had documented cases of
organized fraudulent redemptions New Hampshire. New York has an even greater border
with the non-bottle bill state of Pennsylvania. Additionally, New York City has a smaller
but dense border with New Jersey, both in terms of population and retail establishments. As
such, these other cases present opportunities for further research and study of this important
policy issue.
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Table 1.10: Marginal Effects of a Probit Regression Examining Sales and Distance
(1) (2) (3)
Sale 2LCoke 12Coke 24BudLite
Spmkt 0.38369*** 0.48068*** 0.41498***
(0.090) (0.032) (0.038)
Michigan -0.70121*** 0.14693 -0.72386***
(0.092) (0.164) (0.044)
Ohio -0.25167*** 0.07943*** -0.23290***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.050)
Log Minutes 0.00244 0.06594* 0.01499
(0.006) (0.036) (0.011)
Mich*Log Minutes 0.11622*** -0.04601* 0.09776***
(0.021) (0.026) (0.006)
Ohio*Log Minutes 0.01000 -0.05059*** 0.02089**
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009)
Sales Tax (Per.Points) -0.66015*** -0.02542 -0.46935***
(0.063) (0.064) (0.088)
Log Total Pop -0.00710 0.01110 0.03412
(0.038) (0.013) (0.037)
Log Med. HH Income 0.17112 -0.11658* 0.15494***
(0.194) (0.063) (0.032)
Log Med. Home Value 0.02369 0.14430* -0.09538**
(0.136) (0.081) (0.037)
Log Density -0.00661 -0.04427*** -0.02840
(0.044) (0.010) (0.036)
Log Retail Density 0.01570 0.02987 0.05154***
(0.050) (0.029) (0.013)
Observations 346 346 337
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by state.
Baseline is an Indiana non-supermarket in February. Month co-
efficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.11: 2 Liter Coke Regressions with Spmkt Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
2L Coke Michigan Michigan Indiana Indiana Ohio Ohio
Spmkt -0.34565** -0.38208 -0.39061*** -0.02015 -0.40317*** -0.28504***
(0.125) (0.231) (0.089) (0.117) (0.043) (0.054)
Log Minutes -0.05844* -0.04836 0.05911** 0.06831*** 0.04425* 0.05767***
(0.031) (0.030) (0.025) (0.018) (0.024) (0.019)
Log Minutes*Spmkt -0.00557 0.08127 -0.02494 -0.05448 -0.01466 -0.02569
(0.042) (0.082) (0.042) (0.036) (0.029) (0.023)
Log Total Pop -0.07036* -0.06956*** 0.01892 -0.01580 -0.05304 -0.04477
(0.039) (0.024) (0.039) (0.036) (0.040) (0.034)
Log Med. HH Income -0.12940 -0.08872 0.14758 0.13608 -0.03495 0.07999
(0.113) (0.111) (0.419) (0.290) (0.229) (0.223)
Log Med. Home Value -0.09977 -0.06971 0.11803 0.10348 -0.02852 -0.09209
(0.068) (0.081) (0.355) (0.248) (0.214) (0.217)
Log Density 0.09541** 0.08258*** 0.01579 0.04279* 0.04021 0.01719
(0.037) (0.023) (0.029) (0.022) (0.032) (0.026)
Log Retail Density -0.07749** -0.05858*** 0.00507 -0.03273* -0.03274 -0.00310
(0.032) (0.018) (0.028) (0.017) (0.036) (0.030)
Sales Tax (Per.Points) -0.01229 -0.09185
(0.152) (0.122)
Sale -0.48449*** -0.44763*** -0.25989***
(0.064) (0.085) (0.069)
Constant 4.77671*** 4.05042*** -1.60050 -1.07650 2.89297* 2.85725**
(0.712) (0.686) (1.281) (1.323) (1.418) (1.164)
Observations 108 108 99 99 86 86
R-squared 0.476 0.679 0.362 0.549 0.476 0.560
Spmkt Trend -0.064 0.033 0.034 0.014 0.030 0.032
P-Value 0.023 0.590 0.406 0.682 0.280 0.175
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is a non-supermarket in
February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
48
Table 1.12: 12 Pack Coke Regressions with Spmkt Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
12Coke Michigan Michigan Indiana Indiana Ohio Ohio
Spmkt -1.97936*** -2.12840*** 0.91837 0.70598* -0.66540*** -0.65609***
(0.311) (0.259) (0.550) (0.405) (0.158) (0.143)
Log Minutes -0.08714 -0.10948 0.05646 0.03001 0.21918** 0.15444**
(0.130) (0.121) (0.071) (0.068) (0.084) (0.066)
Log Minutes*Spmkt 0.27113** 0.42377*** -0.48025*** -0.26531* -0.20507** -0.06820
(0.126) (0.111) (0.168) (0.129) (0.081) (0.068)
Log Total Pop -0.11056 -0.07256 -0.09103 -0.08810 -0.09005 -0.07285
(0.109) (0.093) (0.121) (0.109) (0.115) (0.116)
Log Med. HH Income 0.24881 0.23590 0.89582 0.72611 0.10334 0.29664
(0.533) (0.480) (0.987) (0.571) (0.433) (0.672)
Log Med. Home Value -0.95707 -0.77653 -0.73118 -0.75517* 0.24335 -0.02193
(0.571) (0.491) (0.549) (0.375) (0.433) (0.623)
Log Density 0.18435 0.11449 0.14976 0.11508 0.13278 0.06421
(0.122) (0.101) (0.103) (0.086) (0.077) (0.090)
Log Retail Density -0.20603* -0.12718 -0.10128 -0.11613* -0.04987 0.01373
(0.108) (0.097) (0.070) (0.056) (0.042) (0.054)
Sales Tax (Per.Points) 0.20612 0.26945
(0.515) (0.398)
Sale -0.79203*** -0.99532*** -0.90346***
(0.135) (0.126) (0.154)
Constant 14.35206*** 12.55008*** 3.94864 6.33693 -1.01403 -0.15237
(3.045) (2.581) (6.111) (5.058) (4.500) (3.827)
Observations 91 91 92 92 81 81
R-squared 0.627 0.726 0.437 0.593 0.432 0.543
Spmkt Trend 0.184 0.314 -0.424 -0.235 0.014 0.086
P-Value 0.021 0.000 0.004 0.021 0.816 0.176
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is a non-supermarket in
February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
49
Table 1.13: 6 Pack Budweiser Regressions with Spmkt Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
6Bud Michigan Michigan Indiana Indiana Ohio Ohio
Spmkt -1.05713*** -1.05713*** -0.37015 -0.35133 -0.21040 -0.21040
(0.290) (0.290) (0.327) (0.334) (0.187) (0.187)
Log Minutes -0.02489 -0.02489 0.10380** 0.10681** -0.09322* -0.09322*
(0.041) (0.041) (0.041) (0.039) (0.048) (0.048)
Log Minutes*Spmkt 0.17958* 0.17958* -0.07878 -0.08092 -0.06056 -0.06056
(0.100) (0.100) (0.121) (0.125) (0.139) (0.139)
Log Total Pop 0.06805 0.06805 -0.26772* -0.27847* 0.09657 0.09657
(0.068) (0.068) (0.137) (0.136) (0.110) (0.110)
Log Med. HH Income 0.45107** 0.45107** 0.41840 0.39923 0.45894 0.45894
(0.166) (0.166) (0.489) (0.490) (0.472) (0.472)
Log Med. Home Value -0.43864** -0.43864** -1.05189 -1.04681 -0.36032 -0.36032
(0.196) (0.196) (0.699) (0.701) (0.332) (0.332)
Log Density -0.03387 -0.03387 0.30807*** 0.31798*** -0.07347 -0.07347
(0.060) (0.060) (0.103) (0.103) (0.119) (0.119)
Log Retail Density 0.08487* 0.08487* -0.28235** -0.28140** -0.01548 -0.01548
(0.047) (0.047) (0.109) (0.110) (0.045) (0.045)




Constant 6.40759*** 6.40759*** 14.99149** 15.16099** 3.35610* 3.35610*
(2.038) (2.038) (6.018) (6.001) (1.763) (1.763)
Observations 97 97 49 49 77 77
R-squared 0.248 0.248 0.658 0.662 0.145 0.145
Spmkt Trend 0.155 0.155 0.025 0.026 -0.154 -0.154
P-Value 0.129 0.129 0.858 0.855 0.356 0.356
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is a non-supermarket in
February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.14: 24 Pack BudLite Regressions with Spmkt Dummy
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
24BudLite Michigan Michigan Indiana Indiana Ohio Ohio
Spmkt -2.58814** -2.84078** -0.50776 0.12163 0.27918** 0.31766**
(1.019) (1.086) (1.003) (1.090) (0.127) (0.126)
Log Minutes -0.27975** -0.24056* 0.04907 0.04339 0.13813*** 0.15222***
(0.120) (0.122) (0.145) (0.161) (0.041) (0.047)
Log Minutes*Spmkt 0.35944 0.60416** -0.36945 -0.31343 -0.04974 -0.04950
(0.249) (0.280) (0.232) (0.187) (0.066) (0.068)
Log Total Pop -0.12035 -0.00726 -0.22868 -0.20632 -0.00954 -0.01532
(0.198) (0.206) (0.556) (0.472) (0.115) (0.118)
Log Med. HH Income -0.88654 -0.77047 -3.18802** -2.83778 -0.93720** -0.88901*
(0.995) (0.974) (1.473) (1.715) (0.437) (0.423)
Log Med. Home Value -0.59577 -0.49672 2.48451 2.36221 1.03865** 0.99720**
(0.691) (0.700) (1.689) (1.593) (0.439) (0.424)
Log Density 0.19770 0.07780 0.31845 0.29274 0.09194 0.09473
(0.190) (0.197) (0.614) (0.514) (0.088) (0.091)
Log Retail Density -0.21677* -0.11560 -0.33474 -0.24861 -0.08589 -0.08075
(0.122) (0.121) (0.649) (0.479) (0.061) (0.059)
Sales Tax (Per.Points) 0.81658*** 0.77428***
(0.219) (0.203)
Sale -1.11746*** -1.48836 -0.14211
(0.247) (0.869) (0.126)
Constant 35.58890*** 32.71156*** 22.81986** 20.51338** 9.40850*** 9.61269***
(6.655) (6.423) (8.155) (8.234) (2.492) (2.472)
Observations 105 105 70 70 91 91
R-squared 0.318 0.349 0.332 0.417 0.210 0.215
Spmkt Trend 0.080 0.364 -0.320 -0.270 0.088 0.103
P-Value 0.716 0.151 0.365 0.337 0.133 0.143
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is a non-supermarket in
February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.15: Michigan Split Sample - 2L Coke Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
2LCoke Indiana Side Indiana Side Ohio Side Ohio Side
Spmkt -0.28406 -0.61169*** -0.29795* -0.12717
(0.186) (0.153) (0.141) (0.157)
Log Minutes -0.10649** -0.07515* 0.01334 0.00537
(0.035) (0.034) (0.065) (0.057)
Log Minutes*Spmkt 0.01908 0.17809** -0.06378 -0.01194
(0.059) (0.062) (0.046) (0.053)
Log Total Pop -0.14489* -0.04357 -0.04434 -0.11890*
(0.072) (0.060) (0.063) (0.062)
Log Med. HH Income -0.05818 -0.13554 -0.06892 -0.37069
(0.196) (0.228) (0.154) (0.243)
Log Med. Home Value -0.22854 -0.07673 -0.14252 0.12327
(0.135) (0.109) (0.144) (0.210)
Log Density 0.12226** 0.03391 0.08056 0.13959**
(0.052) (0.047) (0.072) (0.059)
Log Retail Density -0.06057 -0.03481 -0.07476 -0.10195**
(0.035) (0.019) (0.067) (0.045)
Sale -0.58217*** -0.44369***
(0.071) (0.064)
Constant 6.15576*** 4.71688** 4.11719*** 4.77662***
(1.730) (1.450) (0.848) (0.913)
Observations 45 45 63 63
R-squared 0.511 0.764 0.536 0.670
Spmkt Trend -0.087 0.103 -0.050 -0.007
P-Value 0.320 0.216 0.289 0.895
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by zip. Baseline is a
non-supermarket in February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.16: Michigan Split Sample - 24 Bud Lite Regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4)
24BudLite Indiana Side Indiana Side Ohio Side Ohio Side
Spmkt -3.55503*** -3.95152*** 0.76640 0.70286
(0.543) (0.726) (0.723) (0.882)
Log Minutes -0.58389** -0.54158** 0.68422 0.81474*
(0.212) (0.225) (0.425) (0.401)
Log Minutes*Spmkt 0.66277*** 0.95741*** -0.74734** -0.48265
(0.193) (0.222) (0.272) (0.346)
Log Total Pop -0.76153 -0.57521 -0.22536 -0.12747
(0.438) (0.508) (0.318) (0.291)
Log Med. HH Income -0.18784 0.02830 -0.79474 -0.67554
(0.892) (1.034) (1.381) (1.184)
Log Med. Home Value -1.95225*** -1.75284*** -0.33570 -0.19959
(0.303) (0.405) (1.265) (1.104)
Log Density 0.51885 0.34065 0.37913 0.26293
(0.367) (0.438) (0.337) (0.314)
Log Retail Density -0.31233 -0.18650 -0.32356 -0.21019
(0.249) (0.271) (0.317) (0.314)
Sale -1.33671 -1.48121***
(0.740) (0.410)
Constant 48.82889*** 43.36298*** 28.26008*** 24.77167***
(10.039) (10.146) (5.844) (5.059)
Observations 45 45 60 60
R-squared 0.522 0.553 0.332 0.400
Spmkt Trend 0.079 0.416 -0.063 0.332
P-Value 0.743 0.090 0.827 0.293
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by zip. Baseline is a
non-supermarket in February. Month coefficients omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.17: Indiana-Michigan Combined Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 2LCoke-InMi 12Coke-InMi 6Bud-InMi 24BudLite-InMi
Spmkt 0.02194 0.80711* -0.35894 0.09092
(0.113) (0.416) (0.212) (1.001)
Log Minutes 0.06660*** 0.02793 0.11660** 0.08247
(0.020) (0.077) (0.050) (0.101)
Michigan 0.37408*** 0.67210 0.24698 1.56917
(0.131) (0.690) (0.280) (1.045)
Mich*Spmkt -0.45488* -2.39050*** -0.52733** -3.55587*
(0.264) (0.795) (0.247) (1.774)
Spmkt*Log Minutes -0.06593* -0.32758** -0.14025* -0.28855
(0.036) (0.147) (0.072) (0.209)
Mich*Log Minutes -0.11853*** -0.08264 -0.11108 -0.45229**
(0.037) (0.293) (0.086) (0.200)
Mich*Spmkt*Log Minutes 0.15646* 0.58946* 0.29489*** 1.02279**
(0.086) (0.302) (0.091) (0.476)
Sale -0.47936*** -0.99242*** 0.14170 -1.50599**
(0.071) (0.118) (0.372) (0.685)
Constant 0.20006 8.02685 7.24679** 28.29351***
(1.430) (5.225) (3.282) (6.473)
Observations 144 126 93 115
R-squared 0.594 0.578 0.471 0.429
Spmkt Border Gap 0.081 1.718 0.280 1.987
P-Value 0.729 0.003 0.155 0.413
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is an Ohio
non-supermarket in February. Month coefficients and standard controls omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.18: Ohio-Michigan Combined Regression
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES 2LCoke-OhMi 12Coke-OhMi 6Bud-OhMi 24BudLite-OhMi
Spmkt -0.25251*** -0.58590*** -0.22039 0.56787***
(0.060) (0.146) (0.172) (0.200)
Log Minutes 0.06645*** 0.10991 -0.05377 0.22430***
(0.021) (0.070) (0.048) (0.060)
Michigan 0.13261 0.40875 0.76233 -1.22901*
(0.162) (0.350) (0.642) (0.712)
Mich*Spmkt 0.06619 -1.32857*** -1.14665*** 0.11825
(0.083) (0.248) (0.414) (0.498)
Spmkt*Log Minutes -0.03587 -0.10146 -0.06335 -0.07216
(0.024) (0.066) (0.113) (0.076)
Mich*Log Minutes -0.07498** 0.00633 -0.07171 0.43994*
(0.030) (0.096) (0.210) (0.223)
Mich*Spmkt*Log Minutes -0.00891 0.33484*** 0.25771 -0.56584***
(0.036) (0.121) (0.160) (0.196)
Sale -0.30415*** -0.85626*** -0.76052**
(0.065) (0.094) (0.327)
Constant 3.22066*** 3.43614 3.32620* 16.34004***
(1.111) (3.618) (1.930) (5.010)
Observations 149 138 130 151
R-squared 0.588 0.636 0.229 0.366
Spmkt Border Gap -0.199 0.920 0.384 1.111
P-Value 0.286 0.024 0.443 0.027
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by county. Baseline is an Ohio
non-supermarket in February. Month coefficients and standard controls omitted.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.19: South Bend, IN Border
(1) (2) (3) (4)
South Bend 2LCoke 12Coke 6Bud 24BudLite
Close -0.53744*** -0.99392* -1.24577*** -4.25793**
(0.112) (0.557) (0.411) (1.515)
Michigan -0.23299 -3.88567*** -1.09247** -1.31976
(0.155) (1.142) (0.468) (2.649)
Close*Michigan 0.56584*** 2.80461** 1.94297*** 2.53312
(0.110) (1.162) (0.512) (2.306)
Log Minutes*(1-Close) -0.10490** -0.36391* -0.18162 -1.29484**
(0.038) (0.209) (0.111) (0.489)
Log Minutes*Michigan*(1-Close) 0.11212** 1.55739*** 0.48381*** 0.12064
(0.043) (0.394) (0.166) (0.830)
Log Med. HH Income 0.15217 0.36131 0.33815 -0.88157
(0.206) (0.608) (0.367) (1.602)
Log Density 0.00921 0.08945 0.08375 -0.02089
(0.027) (0.087) (0.057) (0.230)
Log Retail Density -0.01457 -0.03329 0.01034 -0.05512
(0.013) (0.029) (0.052) (0.099)
Sale -0.41084*** -0.90427*** -2.54815***
(0.106) (0.266) (0.838)
Constant 0.51895 1.80313 2.64049 31.53890*
(2.327) (6.812) (4.158) (17.393)
Observations 53 45 38 45
R-squared 0.448 0.551 0.272 0.370
Border Gap Estimate -0.333 1.081 -0.851 -1.213
P-Value 0.003 0.005 0.034 0.134
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by zip.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 1.20: Toledo, OH Border
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Toledo 2LCoke 12Coke 6Bud 24BudLite
Close 0.75751* -1.75340 -0.32586 -0.62753
(0.364) (1.793) (0.304) (0.688)
Michigan 2.88980*** -1.47089 0.55196 3.32186**
(0.659) (3.449) (0.600) (1.433)
Close*Michigan -2.71886*** 2.23654 -0.49293 -4.48952***
(0.734) (3.783) (0.680) (1.569)
Log Minutes*(1-Close) 0.33524** -0.55614 -0.18373 -0.02293
(0.145) (0.753) (0.137) (0.309)
Log Minutes*Michigan*(1-Close) -1.00568*** 0.59504 -0.01945 -1.33795**
(0.245) (1.259) (0.235) (0.594)
Log Med. HH Income 0.06316 -0.37613 0.23825 0.79259**
(0.205) (0.601) (0.179) (0.297)
Log Density 0.02914 -0.16254 0.07568* 0.14583**
(0.029) (0.140) (0.039) (0.063)
Log Retail Density 0.00400 0.00500 -0.00849 0.02126***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.006) (0.006)
Sale -0.41636*** -1.07084*** -0.65624*
(0.063) (0.182) (0.328)
Constant 0.06808 11.37039 3.63489 8.64297**
(2.421) (8.453) (2.145) (3.870)
Observations 58 53 64 70
R-squared 0.446 0.336 0.295 0.282
Border Gap Estimate -0.171 -0.766 -0.059 1.168
P-Value 0.198 0.073 0.697 0.001
Robust standard errors are in parentheses and clustered by zip.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER II
Equilibria and Location Choice in Corporate Tax
Regimes: Implications of Preferential Taxation
2.1 Introduction
Continued globalization has resulted in a more integrated world market such that firms and
capital investments have become increasingly mobile on an international scale. As a result,
countries seeking additional tax revenues are implementing policies to attract these outside
sources. One such policy is the preferential tax treatment of more mobile foreign firms and
capital. Under a preferential regime, different tax bases have their own tax rates. Ireland is
the most commonly cited example. The Finance Act of 1980 lowered the corporate income
tax rate from 32% to 10% for the manufacturing and manufacturing related sectors. By
the early 1990’s, this lower rate had been extended to other sectors such as technology and
finance. These preferential policies were targeted towards sectors with strong ties to foreign
firms/investment, and are regarded as a primary reason for Ireland’s high GDP growth.
However, the usage of such policies is frowned upon by policymakers in larger, multi-
country organizations. Both the EU and OECD have suggested that the preferential treat-
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ment of these more mobile foreign bases is detrimental towards national tax revenues. Unilat-
erally, each country has a revenue incentive to adopt the less restrictive, preferential regime.35
The adoption of preferential regimes by all countries, however, is believed to exacerbate tax
competition in equilibrium and result in a race to the bottom. Competing preferential foreign
rates could result in depressed national revenues due to the strategic interactions between
countries. Conversely, banning preferential taxes could lessen tax competition as countries
would only have access to a single, uniform tax rate for all bases. This debate therefore fo-
cuses on the difference in countries’ equilibrium revenues when countries are allowed to adopt
preferential policies versus when such policies are restricted. Are equilibrium tax revenues
higher or lower when countries are competing with two, base-specific tax rates as opposed
to one tax rate?36
Unlike policymakers, the economic literature is split on this issue. Janeba and Peters
[1999] was one of the first papers to formally model this tax regime choice. The paper showed
that a given country is weakly better off in revenue terms by allowing for multiple tax rates.
In a Prisoner’s Dilemma type argument, however, allowing all countries to adopt preferential
policies results in lower global tax revenues. Keen [2001] found that the opposite is true. In
a symmetric, two country model with two tax bases of differing mobilities/tax elasticities,
a preferential regime focused tax competition on the relatively mobile sector. This shielded
the relatively immobile sector and allows for greater overall revenue extraction. Conversely,
a uniform tax rate exposes both sectors and results in lower revenues. In response, Janeba
and Smart [2003] analyzed a more generalized model with aggregate tax base effects. The
35The set of possible tax rates under a preferential regime is larger, and includes the set of possible tax
rates under the non-preferential regime. If a country decides to differentiate its tax rates and set a lower
foreign, then it must be better off revenue-wise else it could have set a uniform rate.
36For the remainder of this paper, preferential or non-preferential will always refer to this larger, across
all countries question.
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Keen result could be characterized as a special case where the aggregate tax bases are fixed.
In general, the authors found that a non-preferential regime is revenue-dominant.37
Other papers have added to and/or adjusted aspects of the basic models. Bucovetsky
and Haufler [2007] found that Keen’s result is robust to asymmetry of country sizes, while
Haupt and Peters [2005] found that the opposite is true when adding home bias. Home bias
is an empirically identified phenomenon whereby portfolios are skewed towards domestic in-
vestments - see Lewis [1999]. They found that partially restricting a preferential regime, i.e.,
limiting the rate gap between a country’s tax rates, is revenue-improving. Oshima [2010]
and Oshima [2009] separately introduced agglomeration and productivity asymmetry be-
tween countries.38 He found that agglomeration supports the preferential regime while the
effect of asymmetry is heavily dependent on the choice of production technologies. Wilson
and Mongrain [forthcoming] allowed for heterogeneity in firm moving costs. The authors
concluded that the non-preferential regime generates substantially more revenue when mov-
ing costs are distributed uniformly, while the opposite is true when there are relatively few
firms with high moving costs.39
This paper advances the literature by analyzing a richer model that addresses three
major issues with the current literature. First, most models assume that firms, investments,
and/or countries are identical. This often leads to Bertrand style all-or-nothing responses.
Equilibria are typically non-existent or, when they do exist, unrealistic. To construct models
37The literature on modeling tax competition falls into two camps. One camp follows the more classical
conventions of Zodrow and Mieszkowski [1986] and Wilson [1986]. The other, New Economic Geography
(NEG), follows the agglomeration models of Baldwin and Krugman [2004] in which firms generate positive
spillovers by locating near each other. These NEG-style models typically result in some level of hysteresis as
firms now have greater incentives to remain in larger clusters as opposed to moving for marginal tax charges.
38Burbidge et al. [2006] also considers differential cross-country productivity. Their emphasis, however, is
on the shares of foreign ownership in each firm/country.
39Surveys of the theoretical tax competition literature include Genschel and Schwarz [2011], and Wilson
[1999]. Devereux et al. [2008] provide a review of recent empirical trends in corporate taxation.
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with more realistic interior solutions, some form of heterogeneity must be present in the
model. Wilson and Mongrain [forthcoming] and Baldwin and Krugman [2004] do so by
having heterogeneous moving costs and agglomeration technologies, respectively. Another
common method is simply to assume smoothness over the base/revenue functions. Second,
firms’ potential domestic and foreign profits/returns are assumed to be equal, i.e., gross
profits are independent of location. I refer to this as the property of perfectly correlated
(one-to-one) cross-country profits. This also has the property of inducing the all-or-nothing
response as it assumes that countries are identical with regards to profit generation. Third,
while previous papers have expanded models to include aspects such as moving costs and
asymmetric countries, they have all done so separately. The literature currently lacks a
comprehensive model that jointly incorporates these considerations. Papers have relied on
relatively simplistic models due to the analytical intractability of solving for equilibrium tax
rates and revenues in less restrictive settings.
In this paper, regime choice is analyzed in the context of a single period, two country
model which jointly incorporates the following factors. First, firms are heterogeneous in their
profits. Second, countries are allowed to be asymmetric in both population (the number of
firms) and productivity. Third, moving costs and moving cost deductibility are introduced.
Fourth, I consider the two cases of perfectly correlated and non-correlated profits. The goal
of this paper is to analyze the revenue implications of preferential versus non-preferential
regimes. Specifically, are there cases where countries can generate greater revenues in an
equilibrium with preferential regimes? Given the introduction of imperfect profit correlation,
we now have the possibility for “natural”firm movement in the absence of taxes.40 Therefore,
I also examine the impact of regime choice on firms’ location choices. This is quantified by
40This is novel in the tax competition literature and represents a significant divergence. Any cost-inducing
movement was previously assumed to be inefficient.
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comparing the level of total, net-of-moving-cost profits with and without taxes.41
As expected, the analytical results from this model are limited, so a numerical, compu-
tational approach is used to construct countries’ best response functions and the resulting
pure strategy Nash Equilibrium revenues. Four main results are presented in this paper.
First, the preferential regime generates more revenue than the non-preferential regime in
cases where productivities are sufficiently asymmetric and profits are non-correlated. These
country-level differences mitigate the negative effects of tax competition by decreasing the
relative number of tax-sensitive firms. Because countries are effectively targeting a distinct
set of firms within each base, preferential taxation generates greater equilibrium revenues.
This result is strengthened if the more productive country has less population. Higher mov-
ing costs increase (decrease) this likelihood when a country is more (less) productive, while
higher moving cost deductibility tends to go against the preferential regime. Second, the
choice of regime does not matter when moving costs are zero. Under perfect mobility, both
regimes generate identical equilibria. This result is robust to profit correlation and country
asymmetries. Third, pure strategy Nash Equilibria do not exist when profits are perfectly
correlated and moving costs are strictly positive. This is caused by discontinuities in coun-
tries’ best response functions. Fourth, the preferential regime impacts firms’ location choices
to a lesser extent than the non-preferential regime except when moving cost deductibility is
high.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 lays out the analytical model.
Section 3 details the numerical model. Section 4 presents the four main results in greater
detail. Finally, Section 5 concludes and discusses policy implications.
41Section 3 discusses how we can connect location choice to traditional connotations of efficiency.
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2.2 The Standard Model
Following the notation of Keen [2001], consider a single period game with two countries and
two tax bases. The size of each base is normalized to one so let b and B denote the fractions
of each base that locate in Country A. Country A has access to tax rates t and T which
are the rates applicable to bases b and B, respectively. The other country’s tax rates are
denoted by t∗ and T ∗.
Because governments are assumed to be revenue maximizers, the objective function for




∗) + TB(T, T ∗) (2.2.1)
Under a preferential regime, t and T are allowed to be different so countries maximize with
respect to each rate. Expressions for Country A’s optimal tax rates, assuming convexity of
the base functions, are given by:43











From the left-hand side of (2.2.2), we can see that Country A’s optimal t is found by
equating the marginal benefit and marginal cost. Intuitively, a small increase in A’s rate
42Maximizing revenue is arguably the true objective function for policymakers as indicated by EU/OECD
reports. From a modeling standpoint, maximizing revenue also requires fewer assumptions than welfare
maximization. Additionally, the results will be equivalent if we assume that the social marginal benefit of a
dollar of tax revenue is higher than a dollar held privately.
43These require that the base functions be smooth, differentiable, and quasi-concave.
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increases revenues collected from its current base, b, at the cost of lost revenue from those
that exit, tbt. Likewise, we have the analogous interpretation of the optimal T in (2.2.3).
Alternatively, we can express the optimal conditions in terms of tax elasticities. This gives
us the standard, consumer pricing result which says that revenue is maximized by selecting
the price (tax rate) at which demand (tax base) is unit elastic. If Country A adopts the
preferential regime, tax rates are chosen separately such that both elasticities are unit elas-
tic. If it adopts the non-preferential regime, then the two rates must be equal and jointly
considered as seen in (2.2.4). We can therefore denote both bases as being functions of the
uniform rates τ and τ ∗. Notice that the uniform tax rate affects both bases simultaneously.
A marginal increase in the uniform rate now generates greater, concurrent gains and losses
from both bases.










What can we infer from these equations? If the bases are identical and/or have equal
tax elasticities, then there are no differences between the two regimes, i.e., tax rates and
revenues are the same regardless of whether Country A optimizes over the two bases jointly
or separately.44 From a third degree price discrimination standpoint, this is equivalent to the
optimal pricing problem when there are two equal demand groups. Group specific pricing is
only revenue enhancing if the groups are different. Otherwise, the group specific rates are
equal and a single, uniform price is sufficient. More generally, the rates will be same if the
elasticities are unit elastic at the same, optimal tax rate.
We can also generalize the model to include population. In the tax competition literature,
44This basic result has been noted in Keen [2001] as well as a number of other papers.
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population refers to the sizes of the bases. Keeping the masses of the bases normalized to
one, let Nb and NB be population multipliers such that Country A now receives revenues of
tNbb+ TNBB. Notice that the population multipliers do not affect the optimal preferential
tax rates as they drop out of (2.2.2) and (2.2.3). Population does, however, affect the uniform
rate. We can think of the population ratio, Nb/NB, as the relative weight placed on revenues
from b as opposed to B. The optimum uniform tax rate will therefore be the same for equal
Nb/NB ratios such as (Nb, NB) = (2, 1) and (Nb, NB) = (4, 2). Taking the tax rates of the
other country as a given, we can also say that t ≥ τ ≥ T will be true if base b is weakly less
mobile/elastic than base B.45
As shown in Janeba and Peters [1999], each country has a weak incentive to unilaterally
adopt the preferential regime. Recall that the non-preferential regime is a special case of the
preferential regime where the two rates are constrained to be equal. Therefore, preferential
taxation is a weakly dominant strategy, i.e., revenues are equal if not greater with two
separate tax rates regardless of the other country’s choice of rates and/or regime. However,
the resulting equilibrium revenues when both countries adopt preferential regimes may or
may not be higher than revenues when both countries have non-preferential regimes.
Evaluating revenues when the base elasticities are different is problematic. First, we
cannot derive a specific solution for the optimal tax rate as is oftentimes true in optimal
taxation problems. Even if we applied a functional form to b and B, it would not always be
possible to isolate for the tax rates let alone characterize the equilibrium tax rates. Second,
recall that the central research question is to compare equilibrium revenues across regimes.
This is difficult due to the difference in the number of choice variables, i.e., tax instruments.
Previous papers have worked around this issue by making simplifying assumptions to reduce
45The proof is shown in the Appendix C. The opposite result will hold if B is less responsive than b.
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the number of choice variables in the preferential regime’s optimization problem.
Keen [2001] does so by making three assumptions. First, he assumes that the bases
depend only on the cross-country rate differentials, t− t∗ and T − T ∗, such that the actual
tax rate levels no longer matter. Second, the bases are assumed to be smooth with respect
to the differentials. Third, the two countries and the resulting equilibrium are assumed to be
symmetric. Together, these three assumptions allow Keen to say that the rate differentials
must be equal to zero in equilibrium. Because the bases only depend on the differential,
the actual tax rates become irrelevant and the equilibrium revenues are now only functions
of b(t, t∗) and B(T, T ∗) for any set of tax rates where t − t∗ = 0 and T − T ∗ = 0. This
allows for comparisons across regimes. Janeba and Smart [2003] reduce the variable space by
exogenously fixing the within-country rate gap, t−T and t∗−T ∗, to be some constant θ. This
is meant to represent a small restriction on the preferential regime. It is an approximation
of the unrestricted preferential regime if we assume that the actual rate gap is close or equal
to θ. The strategies employed by the two previous models highlight the need for additional
assumptions in order to gain analytical tractability. Below, I describe the numerical model
which moves away from such assumptions.
2.3 The Numerical Model
Consider again the single period model with two countries, A and B. In each country, there
is a continuum of profit maximizing, atomistic firms. Alternatively, we can include multina-
tionals by interpreting these larger firms as a collection of atoms where each individual atom
would then represent a separate activity, operation, or subsidiary. We can also interpret
these atoms as units of capital investment which can be invested domestically or abroad in
the form of FDI. I will use the firm interpretation for the remainder of the paper.
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Each firm is characterized by its profit pair, (πA, πB), where πj denotes the profits it would
make if located in country j.46 This is private information known by the firms. Conversely,
governments only know that the distribution of firms/profit pairs for those originally located
in country j follows fj(πA, πB). For the numerical model, assume that both the domestic and
potential foreign profits of original firms in country j are distributed uniformly in 0 and π̄j.
Under the assumption that fA = fB, this implies that the profit pairs in both countries are
drawn from a bivariate uniform distribution over [0, π̄A] x [0, π̄B]. Additionally, we can say
that Country A is more productive than Country B if π̄A > π̄B.
47 This allows us to analyze
symmetric productivity cases such as (π̄A, π̄B) = (1, 1), as well as asymmetric cases when the
upper bounds are different. As in the previous section, country size/population is defined as
the number of firms originally in a country and is denoted by the multipliers NA and NB. The
different combinations of productivity and population, e.g., (π̄A, π̄B, NA, NB) = (1, 1, 2, 1),
allow us to simulate a number of different scenarios.
The timing of the model proceeds as follows. Countries are initially endowed with a stock
of original firms. Governments simultaneously set profit taxes tj and Tj knowing only the
distributional characteristics and population of firms. tj applies to j’s domestic firms, those
originally from j that remain in j, while Tj applies to its foreign firms, those originally from
k that move to j. Tax rates are bounded between 0 and 1 (0% and 100%) in increments of
0.001 (0.1%). After taxes are set, firms receive their profit draws and make their location
choices under full information. Firms can choose to locate domestically or in the foreign
46These profits can be generated under a monopolistic competition setting similar to a simplified Melitz-
style model. Each atom has a unit of capital that it can locate domestically or abroad. Production is given
by qij(k) = ϕijk where ϕij is a firm-country specific productivity draw. Assume that greater productivity
always generates greater firm profits, i.e., demand is always inelastic. Alternatively, we can assume that
prices are constant (above marginal cost) across countries in which case productivity directly translates into
profits.
47While this restriction on identical f ’s seems strong, empirical work has suggested that firms, at least in
OECD countries, are drawn from identical Pareto distributions.
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country by incurring a fixed moving cost c. The c term can incorporate the monetary cost of
physically relocating and/or adjusting to new regulations or practices in the foreign country.
Finally, profits and tax revenues are realized.
One concern is that models with discrete tax steps may generate different equilibria than
those with continuous tax rates. For example, consider the standard Bertrand model with
two identical zero cost firms. Allowing for ε undercutting results in a single pure strategy
Nash Equilibrium where prices are zero for both firms. If prices are restricted to be in one
cent increments, however, this generates an additional pure strategy equilibrium where both
firms set a price of $0.01 and receive positive profits. However, discrete tax steps are arguably
more appropriate in this model. Actual tax rates are fairly discrete and rarely move into the
hundredth or thousandth decimal. Looking at a model where rates are continuous may be
unrealistic and incorrect if equilibria arise solely due to this construction.
Because firms know their profit draws and tax rates ex ante, location choice is decided
based on the highest net-of-tax, net-of-moving-cost profits. Therefore, a firm originally in
country j will move to country k if:
πk︸︷︷︸
profit in k
− Tk(πk − αc)︸ ︷︷ ︸
tax payment net deductions





where α is the fraction of the moving cost deductible from a firm’s taxable liabilities.48
Following the notion of home bias, assume that firms always choose to stay in the domestic
country when (2.3.1) holds with equality.
The government’s objective is to maximize tax revenues by choosing the optimal tj and
48Negative tax liability is allowed in the model for cases where moving cost deductions exceed profits. This
simulates any potential benefit from tax credit carryover. However, this never occurs as moving would always
be sub-optimal in these situations. As such, the results of the model are unaffected by this assumption.
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Tj. Because this paper focuses on the choice of rates, assume that α is taken as given.
Total tax revenue in country j, Rj, is given by the sum of revenue from domestic firms,
RDj (tj, Tk, α, f), and foreign firms, R
F














Tj(πj − αc)f dπk dπj (2.3.3)
Assuming that the revenue functions are continuous, differentiable, and quasi-concave, we can
maximize with respect to the tax rates. Under most distributions, however, we cannot solve
for the exact tax rates.49 Under the bivariate uniform distribution, the revenue function is
also highly piece-wise. I therefore analyze the model using MATLAB to manually construct
countries’ revenue and best response functions. Pure strategy Nash Equilibria are then
calculated accordingly. Further detail on the optimum rates, coding procedure, and range of
parameters/cases examined are given in Appendix F.
In terms of profit correlation, I consider perfectly correlated and non-correlated profits.
Under non-correlated profits, a firm’s potential profit from locating abroad is independent
of its domestic profit. This implies that f(x, x) = f(x, y) for all x 6= y in the range of π.
The distribution of firms originally in country j can therefore be represented by a uniform
rectangle with πA and πB on the axes. Under perfectly correlated profits, firms make the
49While closed form solutions may exist, the tax variables are non-separable. See Appendix sections D
and E for the optimal tax rate formulas under the previous assumptions.
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same profit in both countries. This implies that f(x, y) = 0 for x 6= y such that positive
density exists only on the 45◦ line with support [0, π̄j]. Fundamentally, profit correlation can
be interpreted as a property of the f distribution. For a given f , profit correlation is greater
the faster the density function falls when moving away from the diagonal because profit
pairs closer to πA = πB are receiving relatively greater weight. Under perfectly correlated
profits, the density falls immediately to zero for any πA 6= πB. Under non-correlated profits,
uniformity implies that all profit pairs have equal probabilities such the density function is
flat and does not fall.50
Figure 2.3.1 depicts the distribution of firms in the case of non-correlated profits with
(π̄A, π̄B) = (1, 1). Notice that population does not affect the graphical interpretation. Firms
located on the dotted, 45◦ line are equally profitable domestically and abroad. Those to the
50The level of profit correlation can also proxy for the costliness of profit shifting between high and low
tax jurisdictions. If firms can freely shift profits, this is equivalent to assuming that profits are location-
independent, i.e., profits are perfectly correlated. As profit shifting becomes more costly, this is equivalent
to a decrease in profit correlation.
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Figure 2.3.1: Distribution of Firms - (π̄A, π̄B) = (1, 1)
left are more profitable in Country B while those to the right are more profitable in A. The
two dashed lines indicate the addition of moving costs. Now, only those firms that make
more profit net of c will move. This results in the two indicated wedges in the top two graphs.
The two solid lines in the bottom two graphs represent the net-of-taxes, net-of-moving cost
equations given by (2.3.1) for an arbitrary set of tax rates. I will refer to these as the AB
and BA lines, i.e., the A to B and B to A moving lines. Those firms originally in A that
71
are located left of the AB line will move to B, while those to the right will remain in A, and
analogously for firms in Country B and the BA line. In comparison the pre-tax movement of
firms in the top graphs, the introduction of taxes and moving cost deductibility now creates
the four additional wedges in the bottom graphs.
When taxes are absent, firms move to the location that affords them the highest net-of-
moving cost profit. The presence of tax rates potentially alters this choice. The degree to
which each regime distorts location choice is quantified by the total net-of-moving cost profit
(TNP) loss. TNP for a given set of tax rates is equal to the sum of all firms’ profits less c.
The TNP loss is therefore the difference in TNP between the no-tax case and the with-tax
case. Under the firm movement interpretation, we can connect location choice distortions
(TNP loss) with traditional notions of efficiency (deadweight loss) if we assume that higher
profits are driven by greater productivity/lower costs, e.g., locating near a required natural
resource. However, moving for higher profits can be inefficient if the profit gains are driven
by greater market power.51 Graphically, we can see the tax distortions by comparing the AB
and BA lines (movement with taxes) against the dashed moving cost lines (without taxes)
in Figure 2.3.1. When all tax rates are zero, the two sets of lines coincide and there are no
distortions.
A number of basic results can be seen from this figure. When moving costs are zero, all
equilibria where tax rates are harmonized, tj = Tk and Tj = tk, generate zero TNP loss.
When moving costs are positive, any positive tax rates will cause the two sets of lines to
diverge so long as deductibility is not 100%. Under non-correlated profits, this guarantees
some amount of TNP loss. Under perfectly correlated profits, positive equilibrium rates can
51Traditionally, the issue of tax competition and efficiency has centered around two main concepts. First, if
tax revenues are applied towards public good provision, then tax competition typically results in inefficiently
lower rates/revenues. Alternatively, if government is seen as a leviathan which sets tax rates that are too
high, then tax competition is a means to check this power and may be efficiency-improving.
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still be non-distortionary as long as the AB and BA lines do not intersect the diagonals line,
i.e., when the domestic rates are weakly smaller than the competing foreign rates. Recall
that there are no firms located in the off-diagonal areas. When c = 0, all allocations result in
zero TNP loss under perfectly correlated profits. This is not true under non-correlated profits
due to the fact that some firms will naturally move. As moving costs increase, however, both
the number of movers and the no-tax TNP will decrease.
2.4 Results
The results center around the revenue and loss gaps. The revenue gap for country j is
defined as the difference between j’s equilibrium revenue when countries are using preferential
regimes and the equilibrium revenue when countries are restricted to using non-preferential
regimes. Therefore, a positive revenue gap implies that country j does better revenue-wise
under the global preferential regime. A negative revenue gap implies that the non-preferential
regime is revenue-dominant. Likewise, the loss gap is defined as the differential TNP loss
between the two regimes. A positive loss gap implies that the preferential regime is less
distortionary because it generates a lower TNP loss.
I will present the main results of the paper by starting with the simplest/most restrictive
model and comparing the changes when elements are added/relaxed.
2.4.1 Perfect Mobility and Regime Indifference
In the simplest and most restrictive baseline model, assume that profits are perfectly cor-
related across countries. Under perfect mobility, both the preferential and non-preferential
regimes result in the same equilibrium rates and revenues. This implies that the equilibrium
73
domestic and foreign rates are the same, and also equal to the equilibrium uniform rate. The
revenue gap is therefore zero for both countries. Likewise for location choice, both regimes
induce the same level of TNP loss. This result holds even if we relax assumptions on profit
correlation and/or symmetric countries.
Proposition 1. Under perfect mobility, the revenue and loss gaps are both zero. The choice
of regime does not matter when c = 0.
Under perfect mobility, the distinction between the bases disappears. Being originally
from Country A or Country B no longer matters if firms can move costlessly. As previously
discussed, this result can be interpreted in the form of a third degree price discrimination
problem with two equally responsive demand groups. The optimum group-specific prices are
the same which implies that the optimum uniform price will also be the same. This is true
when moving costs are zero and distributions are the same across countries.
As an example, consider the case of (π̄A, π̄B, NA, NB) = (1.5, 1, 1, 1) under perfect mobil-
ity and non-correlated profits. Deductibility does not matter for c = 0. While both countries
have the same population, A is more productive than B. This implies that for every firm in
B, there exists a corresponding firm in A that generates 50% more profit. This also implies
that two-thirds of the firms originally in B would generate more gross profit if they moved
to A. The top graph of Figure 2.4.1 depicts the best response functions for A and B under
the non-preferential regime. The intersection indicates a unique pure strategy equilibrium
at (τA, τB) = (0.609, 0.5) which results in revenues of (RA, RB) = (0.69219, 0.28417).
52 As
52The average statutory corporate tax rate in the real world is around 23% which is lower than most rates
in this model. This higher simulated rate is a result of the uniform distribution. Niu [2013a] simulates a
numerical model under a bivariate Pareto distribution of profits which generates more realistic tax rates.
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Figure 2.4.1: Best Responses - (1.5, 1, 1, 1) c = {0, 0.3}
expected, A’s rate is higher because a greater proportion of firms are more profitable in A
than B. This makes it easier for A to both keep and attract firms, and provides it greater
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revenues in equilibrium. Regarding location choice, the non-preferential regime generates a
TNP loss of 0.01727 which is roughly 1% of the no-tax TNP. Under the preferential regime,
A’s equilibrium domestic and foreign tax rates are both 0.609. Likewise, B’s equilibrium
rates are both 0.5. This results in identical equilibrium revenues and TNP losses. Therefore,
the revenue and loss gaps are both zero.
In cases where countries are equally productive, the two regimes can generate unequal
numbers of equilibria. For the case of (π̄A, π̄B, NA, NB) = (1, 1, 1, 1), the non-preferential
regime generates two symmetric equilibria with uniform rates of τ = {0.5, 0.501} and per
country revenues of R = {0.3333, 0.334}. The preferential regime, however, generates four
equilibria. Two of them correspond to the non-preferential equilibria. The other two equi-
libria have combinations of domestic and foreign rates at 0.5 and 0.501 which result in per
country revenues of 0.33367. Because we cannot justify the likelihood of one equilibrium
over the other, a comparison can only be made on the range of equilibrium revenues.53 TNP
losses are equal to zero in all four preferential equilibria.
As a related result, Figure 2.4.2 plots the revenue gap for a number of different cases
in the neighborhood of c = 0. What this suggests is that the revenue gap approaches zero
as moving costs approach zero. While this monotonic relationship does not always hold at
higher values of c, it does imply that decreasing moving costs eventually reduce the potential
revenue losses from having the “wrong” regime.
53If we compare each of the corresponding equilibria in cases where c = 0, the mean revenue gap is roughly
0.00004 or 0.009% in percentage terms.
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Figure 2.4.2: Moving Costs and the Revenue Gap Near c = 0
2.4.2 Perfect Correlation and Non-Existence
Because zero moving costs result in zero revenue and loss gaps, assume that moving costs
are now strictly positive. Returning to the baseline model with perfectly correlated profits,
symmetric countries, and non-zero values of c, I find that the two regimes are again identical
when moving costs are very high. When c is above a max taxation threshold, firms become
sufficiently immobile that countries are now able to fully tax away profits. Further analysis
will therefore consider levels of c greater than zero but below this max taxation threshold.
Under the non-preferential regime, however, pure strategy equilibria no longer exist in this
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range of moving costs. This is caused by the perfect profit correlation assumption.
Proposition 2. When profits are perfectly correlated and moving costs are positive, the
non-preferential regime does not generate any pure strategy equilibria.
We can see this non-existence in Figure 2.4.3 which depicts the non-preferential best
response functions for the case of (1, 1, 1, 1) and c = 0.1. Notice that an intersection does
not exist due to the discontinuities in both functions. From an iterative standpoint, Country
A responds to Country B’s high uniform rate by undercutting. A small, incremental decrease
in the uniform tax rate results in large changes to the domestic and foreign bases. Country
B’s best response is to then undercut A’s uniform rate. Under perfect mobility, this continues
until tax rates reach 0.001 or 0. Notice that setting uniform rates of zero always constitutes
an equilibrium. For any given tax rate, the best response is to always undercut when firms are
perfectly mobile. However, this is no longer true with positive moving costs as countries now
have an immobile group of domestic firms. In the Bertrand literature, this is similar to the
concept of a loyal base. Given these immobile firms, a uniform rate of zero is never optimal
as both countries can simply tax their loyal bases to generate positive revenues. Instead
of continuously undercutting at very low tax rates, countries can do better by setting a
higher tax rate to exploit these immobile firms. We therefore have this jump/discontinuity
phenomenon in the best responses.
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Figure 2.4.3: Best Responses - (1, 1, 1, 1) c = 0.1
Returning to Figure 2.4.3, we can see that A finds it optimal to undercut when B’s
tax rates are high. Undercutting pushes both countries’ rates lower and lower until they
approach the discontinuity. When τB = 0.583, A’s best response is to undercut and set a tax
rate of τA = 0.412. When B’s tax rate drops to τB = 0.582, however, A now finds it optimal
to stop undercutting and instead, jumps up to set a higher tax rate of τA = 0.682. Figure
2.4.4 plots the revenue function for A around the discontinuity. With A setting a uniform
rate of τA = 0.682, B finds it optimal to undercut and the cycle restarts. Thus, there is no
stable pure strategy equilibrium.
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Figure 2.4.4: Revenue Graphs for Country A - Before and After the Jump
Notice that this only occurs under the non-preferential regime. Recall that a single, uni-
form rate must simultaneously balance revenue considerations over both the domestic and
foreign bases. By jumping up, the uniform rate switches from focusing on both bases to
focusing more on its immobile, domestic base. Intuitively, it concedes some level of compe-
tition for foreign firms so it can extract higher revenues from its domestic firms. Because
non-existence, i.e., the jump phenomenon, occurs only because of this switch in focus, ex-
istence is not an issue under the preferential regime. With separate taxes for each base,
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countries do not have to switch focus and can undercut each base separately. For example,
the preferential regime generates equilibrium rates of (tA, TA, tB, TB) = (0.1, 0, 0.1, 0) with
revenues of (RA, RB) = (0.5, 0.5) in the previous example.
Non-existence is a common issue in this literature.54 While some papers introduce func-
tional assumptions to guarantee existence, other papers such as Davies and Eckel [2010]
appeal to mixed-strategies when pure strategies fail. However, the real world applicability
of mixed strategies is questionable. In actuality, tax rates do not appear to vary from year
to year. Alternatively, appealing to a sequential, Stackelberg style equilibrium has been pro-
posed by Janeba and Peters [1999] and Mongrain et al. [2010]. It is also possible to show the
existence of equilibrium loops where countries cycle through a closed set of tax rates. This
paper remains agnostic on the issue so subsequent results focus solely on cases where pure
strategy equilibria exist.
Non-existence also occurs when profits are non-correlated but to a much lesser extent.
This only occurs for higher values of c because the jump phenomenon requires a relatively
large proportion of very immobile firms. As an example, the lower graph in Figure 2.4.1
from the previous result depicts the best response functions for c = 0.3.
2.4.3 Preferential Regime and Sufficient Asymmetry
Returning to the baseline model, we now consider a model with symmetric countries, non-
correlated profits, and non-zero moving costs. In these cases, the revenue gap is negative, i.e.,
the non-preferential regime is revenue-dominant. In the case of (1, 1, 1, 1) and c = 0.1, the
revenue gap is -0.026 which represents a difference equivalent to 7.1% of the non-preferential
54This is also an issue of contention in the game theory literature. Börgers [1992] suggests using iterated
deletion of strictly dominated strategies in lieu of mixed strategies.
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revenue. Allowing for asymmetric productivities and populations, however, flips the revenue
gap.
Proposition 3. The preferential regime is revenue-dominant if productivities are sufficiently
asymmetric. This result is strengthened if the more productive country is also less populous.
Figure 2.4.5 plots the revenue gap for countries with equal populations but productivity
asymmetries that vary between 1% and 50%. Specifically, I fix the productivity of Country
B at π̄B = 1 but consider productivities for Country A in the range of π̄A ∈ [1.01, 1.5].
Figure 2.4.5: Revenue Gap and Productivity Asymmetry I
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Figure 2.4.6: Revenue Gap and Productivity Asymmetry II
Notice that the revenue gap for both countries is increasing with asymmetry. Initially, the
gap is negative which implies that the non-preferential regime is revenue-dominant. When
asymmetry rises to 30% and 37%, the preferential and non-preferential regimes generate the
same equilibrium revenues for the more and less productive countries, respectively. Above
30%, the more productive country now receives greater revenue under the preferential regime.
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Above 37%, both countries find this to be true.55
Figure 2.4.6 graph this relationship for higher asymmetries. Notice that the revenue
gap for the more productive country is increasing but at a decreasing rate. For the less
productive country, the revenue gap eventually starts to decrease but always remains above
zero. As moving costs increase, so does the disparity between the two countries. In the
case of c = 0.2, the more (less) productive country now reaches a revenue gap of zero
when productivity asymmetry is at 26% (45%). When including deductibility, increasing α
generally decreases the revenue gap except when moving costs are high.
Figure 2.4.7: Revenue Gap and Population Asymmetry
55When only one country generates more revenue under the global preferential regime, it is almost always
the case that the sum of both their revenue gaps is positive. Because global revenues are higher under the
preferential regime, this implies that a revenue transfer exists that would make both countries better off
under the preferential regime.
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Figure 2.4.7 graphs the analogous relationship if we consider two equally productive
countries but with aysmmetric populations. Notice that population asymmetry has a similar
albeit far weaker effect. As with productivity, the relationship initially follows a positive,
close to linear trend. The less populous country, however, always has a higher revenue gap
than the more populous country. As such, the less populous country reaches a revenue gap
of zero when population asymmetry is approximately 300% versus the 400% needed for the
more populous country. At higher asymmetries, the revenue gaps for both countries fall back
towards zero.
Figure 2.4.8: Revenue Gap and Productivity-Population Asymmetry
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If we allow for both types of asymmetry simultaneously, the positive effect of productivity
asymmetry on the revenue gap is strengthened when the more productive country is less
populous. Conversely, greater population in the more productive country dampens this
effect. Figure 2.4.8 takes the productivity asymmetry plot in Figure 2.4.5 and overlays two
additional plots. The higher pair of lines corresponds to the revenue gaps when asymmetries
go in opposite directions. The lower pair of lines corresponds to the revenue gap when
asymmetries are aligned.
As an example, consider the case of of (1, 2, 2, 1), c = 0.1, and α = 0. Country A is less
productive but larger in population than country B. Under the preferential regime, A and
B receive revenues of (RA, RB) = (0.409, 1.582). Under the non-preferential regime, the two
countries receive revenues of (RA, RB) = (0.399, 1.55) which results in revenue gaps of 0.01
and 0.032 for A and B, respectively. Expressed in percentages, this amounts to a 2.47% and
2% revenue improvement over the non-preferential revenues. The resulting loss gap is equal
to -0.0095 which represents a 12.3% difference in TNP loss.
Table 2.21: Preferential Equilibria - (1, 2, 2, 1) α = 0
c = tA TA tB TB revenueA revenueB TNP Loss
0 0.5 0.5 0.673 0.673 0.38226 1.62563 0.06997
0.1 0.575 0.427 0.703 0.641 0.40871 1.58206 0.06785
0.2 0.65 0.36 0.732 0.607 0.43666 1.53656 0.06882
0.3 0.725 0.301 0.763 0.573 0.46888 1.49546 0.07145
Why is the preferential regime only revenue-dominant in these particular cases? When
profits are non-correlated, countries have location specific advantages/rents because some
firms are inherently more productive in one country. Assuming that Country A is the more
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productive country, a significant portion of its original firms would generate more profits at
home than they would abroad. Therefore, these firms are strongly incentivized to remain in
A. Likewise, a significant portion of B’s original firms also generate more profits in A. These
firms are strongly incentivized to move. Greater productivity asymmetry increases the pro-
portion of such firms. More importantly, both Country A and Country B face fewer marginal
firms. Because most of the firms are very likely to locate in A, this reduces the proportion of
elastic, tax-sensitive “swing” firms located near the 45◦ line. This also reduces the benefits
of tax competition for Country A. By lowering its rates, it can gain/keep relatively few firms
at the cost of losing much greater revenues from its already large contingent of domestic and
foreign firms. For Country B, it has a relatively small number of strongly incentivized firms
but A’s dominance allows it to set higher rates and extract greater revenues.
To see why the preferential regime is better in this setting, consider the benefit and cost of
switching regimes. There are two revenue effects when countries switch from non-preferential
to preferential taxation. Due to the fact that preferential taxation allows each country to
tailor revenue maximizing tax rates for each base, this grants the preferential regime greater
revenue generating abilities. At the same time, the strategic interaction aspect, i.e., tax com-
petition, is indeed worse with two tax rates. The sum of these two effects, one positive and
one negative, describes the sign of the revenue gap. When countries are symmetric, the neg-
ative tax competition effect dominates and makes the total effect/revenue gap negative. For
sufficiently asymmetric productivities, the dominance of the more productive country miti-
gates the negative tax competition effect. Therefore, the total effect/revenue gap becomes
positive.
This is more pronounced in the case of a smaller, more productive Country A and a larger,
less productive Country B. Recall that Country A is heavily favored and really does not have
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to worry about tax competition. Therefore, Country A will do better under a preferential
equilibrium. For Country B, it will have relatively few remaining firms regardless of the
regime. Due to the moving cost and its larger population, B can generate greater revenues
by focusing on its domestic base as opposed to using a uniform tax rate to try and mediate
between both bases. Thus, the preferential regime is better for Country B as well. In the
opposite scenario, a smaller, less productive Country B now must focus on its foreign base
since Country A has greater population and thus more firms to attract. Whereas the moving
cost made it easier for B to keep its domestic firms in the previous scenario, the moving cost
now makes it harder for B to attract foreign firms. Therefore, we need greater asymmetry
before Country B’s revenue gap becomes positive.56
We can also understand this result by looking at the effect of productivity asymmetry
on the tax rates. From Section 2, we know that t ≥ τ ≥ T is generally true. With higher
productivity asymmetry, larger rents allow A to set higher domestic rates as its domestic
firms are less likely to exit. It can also set higher foreign rates because foreign firms are more
likely to enter. This in turn allows B to increase its own rates. From the perspective of A,
greater productivity asymmetry increases its equilibrium domestic and foreign tax rates by a
factor of 0.128 and 0.161. The same increase only generates a 0.091 increase in the uniform
rate.57 The preferential regime is therefore able to sustain relatively higher rates than the
non-preferential regime which in turn generates greater equilibrium revenues. For Country
B, greater asymmetry decreases its uniform rate more than its preferential rates. Thus, an
56Assuming that pure strategy equilibria existed, this result suggests that higher profit correlation should
theoretically go against the preferential regime because there is less separation between firms. Niu [2013a],
Chapter 3, finds that higher profit correlations do in fact decrease the revenue gap. This also suggests that
greater ease in profit shifting works against preferential regimes.
57These numbers come from a regression of the equilibrium tax rates on productivity and population
asymmetry, the moving costs, and moving cost-deductibility interactions. The full set of coefficients is not
shown.
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increase in productivity asymmetry increases the revenue gap for both countries.
To better quantify the effects of changing asymmetry and moving costs on the loss gap,
Table 2.22 presents regression results on the revenue gap in levels and in percentages. Because
the observations in the sample are simulated data points, there is no randomness in the
regressions.
2.4.4 Less Distortions Under the Preferential Regime
Recall that the loss gap is defined as the difference in TNP loss between the preferen-
tial and non-preferential regimes. A positive (negative) loss gap therefore implies that the
non-preferential (preferential) regime is less distortionary. As previously discussed, the two
regimes generate equal TNP losses when moving costs are zero. When moving costs are
positive and profits are non-correlated, the major determinant of the loss gap is the level of
moving cost deductibility.
Proposition 4. The preferential regime is less distortionary, except when moving cost de-
ductibility is high.
For α = {0, 0.25}, the loss gap is negative, in all cases of productivity and population
asymmetry, and positive moving costs, i.e., the preferential regime is less distortionary at
low levels of deductibility. For α = 0.5, a small number of cases now exist where the non-
preferential regime is less distortionary. Only for α = {0.75, 1} do we see a significant
shift towards the non-preferential. This stems from the fact that the preferential regime
discourages firm movement to a lesser extent than the non-preferential regime. Recall that
domestic rates tend to be higher than the uniform rates which tend to be higher than the
foreign rates. The combination of higher domestic rates and lower foreign rates creates
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greater tax-incentives for firms to move under the preferential regime. When deductibility
is very high, this causes rates to increase but not enough to prevent too much movement.
Table 2.23 presents analogous regression results on the loss gap in levels and in percent-
ages. As we can see, both higher population and productivity asymmetry are negatively
(positively) correlated with the loss gap for the more (less) productive country. The magni-
tude of the productivity effect, however, is much smaller. In terms of moving costs, higher
c decreases the loss gap. This is caused by the sharp decrease in firm movement under the
non-preferential regime. When we factor in deductibility, larger α is positively correlated
with the gap. Moving costs and deductibility therefore have opposite effects, with moving
costs dominating at lower levels of c and deductibility dominating at higher levels.
2.5 Conclusion and Policy Implications
This paper is the first of its kind to look at a more sophisticated and less restrictive model that
jointly incorporates population and productivity asymmetry, moving costs, cost deductibility,
and non-correlated profits in a heterogeneous firm setting. Due to analytical intractability,
the literature lacked a comprehensive model that allowed for these considerations. As such,
this paper sheds light on the preferential/non-preferential debate by analyzing a numerical
model. Compared to previous papers, the results from this paper are more in line with
Janeba and Smart [2003] as opposed to Keen [2001] or Bucovetsky and Haufler [2007] in the
sense that the revenue-dominance of a given regime is case dependent and not universal.
Unlike Janeba and Smart [2003], however, this paper finds a much greater number of cases
under which the non-preferential regime is not revenue-dominant. When moving costs are
zero, the two regimes are nearly identical which implies that regime choice does not matter
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under perfect mobility. When profits are non-correlated and productivity is sufficiently
asymmetric, the preferential regime is now revenue-dominant. This result is strengthened if
the more productive country is also less populous. In regards to location choice distortions,
the preferential regime skewed firms’ decisions to a lesser extent for α < 0.75.
These findings have significant policy implications. Take the example of Canada and
Spain. Both countries have approximately 2.5 million registered firms. As a rough measure
of productivity, both also generate approximately $43 of GDP per labor hour.58 If we believe
that countries such as Canada and Spain are likely to have low levels of productivity and
population asymmetry, then the model suggests that greater revenues could be generated if
they had non-preferential regimes, i.e., Canada and Spain would not offer preferential tax
rates to Canadian or Spanish firms. Conversely, consider the pairing of Belgium and Spain.
Belgium has only 350,000 registered firms but generates $54 of GDP per labor hour. If we
believe that these two countries are likely to have high levels of productivity asymmetry with
opposing population asymmetry, then preferential regimes may result in higher revenues, i.e.,
Belgium and Spain could offer preferential rates to Belgian and Spanish firms.
Overall, the model suggests that tax regimes should be instituted on a country-by-country
basis. Instead of completely banning preferential policies, countries should have specific,
bilateral tax regime agreements. This runs counter to the opinions of the EU and OECD.
Finally, the model also suggests that differences between regimes are shrinking as moving
costs approach zero. As globalization continues and inputs/firms become increasingly mobile,
the potential revenue and distortion costs of implementing the “incorrect” regime are also
decreasing. However, the ever growing fiscal needs of governments ensure that this regime-
revenue debate will remain a pressing and salient issue for the foreseeable future.
58Labor productivity numbers, expressed in US dollars, come from the 2010 OECD Factbook. Firm
numbers come from the 2005 World Bank Development Indicators.
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Table 2.22: Revenue Gap in Levels and Percentages
(Prod Diff ? 0) Level (>) Level (<) Level (=) Percent (>) Percent (<) Percent (=)
Prod Diff 0.074*** -0.041*** 0.069*** -0.104***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
Pop Diff -0.020*** 0.014*** -0.008*** -0.024*** 0.036*** -0.004**
(0.003) (0.002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.004) (0.002)
c = 0.1 -0.028*** -0.023*** -0.027*** -0.027*** -0.055*** -0.062***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.006)
c = 0.2 0.008 -0.018*** 0.012 -0.042***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.008) (0.010)
c = 0.3 -0.006 -0.044*** -0.144*** -0.009 -0.085*** -0.268***
(0.007) (0.005) (0.004) (0.009) (0.012) (0.007)
c = 0.1 a = 0.25 -0.005 -0.002 -0.005** -0.005 -0.006 -0.011**
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005)
c = 0.1 a = 0.5 -0.011 -0.004 -0.008*** -0.010 -0.012 -0.017***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
c = 0.1 a = 0.75 -0.014** -0.005 -0.008*** -0.012 -0.015 -0.018***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
c = 0.1 a = 1 -0.016** -0.005 0.001 -0.014 -0.016 -0.001
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.005)
c = 0.2 a = 0.25 -0.022*** -0.011** -0.029*** -0.024*** -0.031*** -0.063***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
c = 0.2 a = 0.5 -0.041*** -0.020*** -0.051*** -0.046*** -0.055*** -0.109***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
c = 0.2 a = 0.75 -0.051*** -0.023*** -0.065*** -0.056*** -0.064*** -0.137***
(0.006) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
c = 0.2 a = 1 -0.052*** -0.020*** -0.053*** -0.057*** -0.059*** -0.115***
(0.007) (0.004) (0.003) (0.008) (0.011) (0.006)
c = 0.3 a = 0.25 0.050*** 0.026*** 0.001 0.063*** 0.044*** -0.018*
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.013) (0.010)
c = 0.3 a = 0.5 -0.005 -0.000 0.120*** 0.001 -0.028** 0.230***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011)
c = 0.3 a = 0.75 -0.039*** -0.017*** 0.075*** -0.039*** -0.070*** 0.126***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.005) (0.010) (0.012) (0.009)
c = 0.3 a = 1 -0.044*** -0.014*** 0.066*** -0.046*** -0.066*** 0.109***
(0.008) (0.005) (0.004) (0.010) (0.012) (0.007)
The dependent variables are the revenue gaps in levels and percentages of the non-preferential
revenue. The baseline case is zero moving costs and zero deductibility. Columns are sepa-
rated for more, less, and equally productive countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 2.23: Loss Gap in Levels and Percentages
(Prod Diff ? 0) Level (>) Level (<) Level (=) Percent (>) Percent (<) Percent (=)
Prod Diff -0.001 0.001 -0.771** 0.771**
(0.003) (0.003) (0.385) (0.385)
Pop Diff -0.010*** 0.010*** 0.000 -0.343** 0.343** 0.000
(0.001) (0.001) (0.000) (0.167) (0.167) (2.442)
c = 0.1 -0.008*** -0.008*** 0.029*** 0.212 0.212 -0.013
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.373) (0.373) (7.060)
c = 0.2 -0.040*** -0.040*** 0.032 0.032
(0.003) (0.003) (0.379) (0.379)
c = 0.3 -0.046*** -0.046*** -0.046*** 0.010 0.010 -0.068
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.452) (0.452) (8.930)
c = 0.1 a = 0.25 0.005 0.005 0.006*** 0.104 0.104 0.138
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.405) (0.405) (6.061)
c = 0.1 a = 0.5 0.008** 0.008** 0.010*** 0.225 0.225 0.504
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.409) (0.409) (6.235)
c = 0.1 a = 0.75 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.326 0.326 2.322
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.409) (0.409) (6.235)
c = 0.1 a = 1 0.010*** 0.010*** 0.013*** 0.381 0.381 53.389***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.410) (0.410) (6.235)
c = 0.2 a = 0.25 0.017*** 0.017*** 0.012*** 0.085 0.085 0.023
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.411) (0.411) (7.337)
c = 0.2 a = 0.5 0.031*** 0.031*** 0.029*** 0.241 0.241 0.208
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.410) (0.410) (7.862)
c = 0.2 a = 0.75 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.044*** 0.577 0.577 1.221
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.408) (0.408) (7.669)
c = 0.2 a = 1 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.050*** 1.043** 1.043** 48.647***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.410) (0.410) (7.528)
c = 0.3 a = 0.25 0.012*** 0.012*** 0.000 0.146 0.146 -0.043
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.509) (0.509) (11.981)
c = 0.3 a = 0.5 0.020*** 0.020*** 0.076*** 0.178 0.178 0.448
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.479) (0.479) (13.906)
c = 0.3 a = 0.75 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.089*** 0.534 0.534 0.704
(0.004) (0.004) (0.002) (0.476) (0.476) (11.028)
c = 0.3 a = 1 0.058*** 0.058*** 0.106*** 2.759*** 2.759*** 47.722***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.001) (0.474) (0.474) (8.472)
The dependent variables are the loss gaps in levels and percentages of the non-preferential
TNP loss. The baseline case is zero moving costs and zero deductibility. In ten cases, the
non-preferential TNP loss is zero. The percentage loss gap is coded as 100 (the max is 86.88).
Columns are separated for more, less, and equally productive countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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CHAPTER III
Preferential Corporate Taxation and Profit
Correlation Under a Bivariate Pareto
Distribution
3.1 Introduction
Preferential taxation refers to the usage of base discriminatory tax rates as opposed to
non-preferential taxation which imposes a single, uniform tax rate on all bases. This dis-
crimination can be sector-specific as in the case of Ireland which gave its manufacturing
sectors, amongst others, a 10% versus the standard 32% corporate income tax rate in the
1980’s and 1990’s. The true purpose of Ireland’s preferential rates, however, was to attract
a greater number of foreign firms and capital, as the targeted sectors had significant foreign
involvement and investment. Therefore, this sector-based discrimination was, in actuality,
thinly veiled source-based discrimination to increase the foreign tax base.
The success of Ireland and other countries led to an increased usage of preferential tax-
ation. Policymakers in the EU and OECD, however, feared that preferential treatment of
94
more mobile bases would result in competition-driven rate undercutting and an eventual
race to the bottom. They therefore published a number of reports in the early 2000’s iden-
tifying and reprimanding countries using such practices. Since then, many of the offending
preferential tax policies have been either abolished or amended. Ireland, for example, aban-
doned its sector-specific rate and instead imposed a uniform, 12% corporate tax rate for all
firms. However, source-specific preferential taxation still exists most commonly in the form
of FDI-friendly special economic zones in countries such as China and India. These SEZs
offer amenities such as lower statutory rates, special deductions, and temporary tax holidays
for qualifying foreign firms.
Tax competition is not a new concept in the economic literature. Oates [1972] discussed
inefficiencies in the context of local governments competing over mobile capital. The notion
that inter-jurisdictional competition could lead to inefficiently low taxation and misalloca-
tions contrasted greatly with the prevailing Tiebout [1956] hypothesis. Emphasis on the
equilibrium revenue-dominance of preferential versus non-preferential regimes, however, is
fairly recent. Intuitively, all countries have an incentive to unilaterally adopt a preferential
regime with the rationale being that more tax instruments, i.e., flexibility, cannot result in
strictly less revenue. However, allowing all countries to adopt preferential policies may result
in lower levels of equilibrium revenues for all, similar to the Prisoner’s Dilemma result. The
choice, therefore, centers on whether allowing all countries to adopt preferential regimes
generates more or less per-country equilibrium revenues than the counterfactual equilibrium
where all countries have non-preferential regimes.
The two primary voices/papers in this debate are Keen and Janeba. While papers such
as Janeba and Peters [1999], which looked at the choice of regimes from a sequential setting,
tended to support non-preferential taxation for the most part, Keen [2001] presented a simple
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two (symmetric) country, two base model that pointed towards the revenue-dominance of
the preferential regime. The rationale behind his result was that having a separate domestic
versus foreign tax rate shielded the more immobile domestic base from the negative effects
of tax competition. Under non-preferential taxation, a uniform tax rate negatively effects
both bases. The preferential regime, however, focuses competition onto the more mobile
base while allowing the less mobile base to be heavily taxed. This presented a shock to the
literature which prompted other papers to build on or re-evaluate Keen’s result. The most
prominent paper against the Keen [2001] result was Janeba and Smart [2003]. Under a more
generalized model which allowed for perfectly immobile firms and aggregate base effects,
i.e., higher tax rates could not only push capital to a lower jurisdiction but also into other
non-taxed sectors, the authors found that Keen’s model and result could be represented as
a specific case under their larger model. In most cases, however, Janeba and Smart [2003]
found that banning preferential taxation resulted in higher equilibrium revenues. Subsequent
works by others such as Haufler, Haupt, and Wilson have tried to amend these two basic
models.59
This paper builds on my previous Niu [2013b], Chapter 2, model which developed a richer,
more realistic, and less constrained setup that incorporated firm heterogeneity, country-level
productivity and population asymmetries, as well as moving costs and cost deductibility.
Central to this paper, it also introduced the concept of cross-country profit correlation. The
standard assumption in the literature is that profits, returns, etc. are independent of the
country/location choice excluding differences in tax rates and moving costs, i.e., perfect one-
to-one profit correlation. Niu [2013b], however, analyzed the case of perfect non-correlation
where a firm’s profits in different countries are independent and uniformly distributed. In
59See Genschel and Schwarz [2011] for a review of the literature.
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doing so, the paper found that the preferential regime was revenue-dominant in a large
number of cases where profits were perfectly non-correlated.
Niu [2013b] was only able to model the two polar cases of perfect correlation and perfect
non-correlation. The question remains as to the revenue-regime relationship in between these
two extremes. This paper re-examines these results by focusing on the equilibrium revenues
generated under varying levels of imperfect profit correlation. I do so by constructing and
simulating a numerical, copula-based model that incorporates three aspects from the inter-
national literature. (1) Firms’ profits follow Zipf’s Law such that the majority of firms make
very little profit with only a small fraction making large profits.60 (2) Across the OECD
countries, these profits/firms follows the same Pareto distribution in all countries.61 (3) Be-
cause the distributions are the same, differences in profitability/productivity across countries
arise due to variation in draws as well as differences in the population of firms, i.e., the num-
ber of draws. I therefore construct a two country model where firms’ profits are drawn from
two identical bivariate Pareto distributions. To allow for varying levels of profit correlation,
I generate the bivariate Pareto distributions using a heavy-right tail (HRT) copula. This
copula construction allows me to specifically adjust the correlation between cross-country
profits without changing the underlying Pareto marginals.
The simulation results suggest that the effects of imperfect profit correlation on the equi-
librium revenue differences between the two regimes are highly non-linear. The relationship
is approximated using a cubic polynomial which indicates that the direction of marginal
effects from small changes in correlation depend on the current correlation. Additionally,
the effect of correlation is highly dependent on the nature of the correlation - own country
60Axtell [2001] and Fujiwara et al. [2004] both find that firm size, as measured using a number of different
proxies including receipts, follows a power law which is Zipf in many instances.
61See the empirical estimates from di Giovanni et al. [2011].
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versus other country correlation. Overall, however, average increases in the level of profit
correlation tend to decrease the per-country equilibrium revenues generated under the pref-
erential regime relative to the non-preferential regime. Lastly, results from the simulation
show the asymptotic versus small sample disparities between Niu [2013b] and this paper.
While Niu [2013b] analyzed a model with a continuum of firms, this paper simulates a finite
sample scenario. Therefore, results from the asymptotic or large sample model do not fully
carry-over to this smaller, stochastic model. Most notably, I no longer find that differences
between the regimes are zero under perfect mobility.
The remainder of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the model, including
its relationship to Keen [2001] and Niu [2013b]. Section 3 discusses the simulation setup,
parameter values and key variables, and provides relevant summary statistics. Section 4
presents the results of the simulation and Section 5 concludes.
3.2 Model
Following the basic model in Keen [2001], assume that there exist two countries, A and
B, and two tax bases with varying levels of mobility. Under a territorial system, countries
are only able to tax the fraction of each base located within their borders. Notation-wise,
we differentiate between rates on the two bases using tj and Tj for j = {A,B}. In this
one-period, simultaneous game, the two countries set tax rates on the two bases so as to
maximize revenue. After observing the rates, the bases react and move accordingly. The
revenue objective is both a simplifying and realistic assumption. Maximizing revenue requires
fewer assumptions over social welfare, labor distortions, and potential general equilibrium
considerations such as agglomeration. Additionally, the revenue maximization objective is
arguably the correct and true objective of policymakers.
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3.2.1 Firms’ Problem
In the same vein as Niu [2013b], I augment the simple Keen model to include more sophisti-
cated and detailed considerations. First, assume that the two bases are comprised of stocks
of atomistic, profit-maximizing firms. Originally, i.e., prior to firm movement, each country
is endowed with a population of firms. In a heterogeneous firms setting, the profit that
firm i makes in country j, πij, is assumed to follow a Pareto distribution. This is true for
firms originally located in either Country A or B. Each firm is therefore characterized by its
profit pair, (πA, πB), which denotes the profit that it would make if it were located in each
corresponding country. In regards to the timing of the model, assume that firms receive their
profit pair draws prior to deciding on their location choices and after countries’ tax rates
have been set. This implies that firms are operating under full information. They know
exactly how much gross profit they would generate and how much net (of tax) profit they
would retain before deciding whether to stay in their country of origin or relocate abroad.
As is standard, firms act to maximize net profits. For a firm originally located in Country
A, it would receive a net profit of (1− tA)πA where tA refers to the corporate profit tax rate
on domestic firms in A. If the firm moved to Country B, it would receive a net profit of
(1− TB)πB − c where TB refers to the corporate profit tax rate on foreign firms in B. c is a
fixed moving cost and is constant across countries and firms.62
As previously mentioned, both πA and πB follow identical Pareto distributions such that
the potential profit pairs in each country are drawn from identical bivariate Pareto distribu-
tions, f(πA, πB). The literature typically assumes that cross-country profits follow a perfect,
62In the context of start-up, the question arises as to why c > 0 is reasonable if the firm has yet to establish
a location. Given the example of an entrepreneur who has lived in the United States, choosing to start in
Germany could still involve a positive moving cost which we can interpret as the dollar hassle cost of having
to learn and/or adjust to new laws, best practices, etc.
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one-to-one profit correlation, i.e., πiA = πiB for all firms i. Distributionally, this means that
f(πA, πB) = 0 in all cases where πA 6= πB. Niu [2013b] also looked at the other extreme case
of perfect non-correlation such that πA and πB were independent of each other. The indepen-
dence implied that the profitability of a given firm in one country provides no information
regarding its profitability in the other country.
This paper/model analyzes levels of imperfect correlation, as it would be plausible to
assume that a highly profitable firm in Country A would likely be highly profitable as well in
Country B, at least to some extent. To do so, I construct the bivariate Pareto distribution
using a heavy-right tail (HRT) copula.63 Derived from Sklar’s Theorem, a copula is simply
a functional form that can model, and more importantly, vary the degree of dependency be-
tween multiple, univariate random variables. Written in terms of the marginal distribution
functions of any set of univariate variables, a copula is able to generate a cumulative multi-
variate distribution function denoted by C(u1, u2, ...ui).
64 The cumulative density function
of the HRT copula is given by:









The u terms represent the marginal univariate profit distributions in Countries A and B.
Because I have set these to be univariate Pareto distributions following the international
literature, let uj = 1 − π−θj such that πj ∈ [1,∞) for j = {A,B}. In each distribution,
the θ term, bounded from below at one, determines how quickly the density tails off for
higher profits. As θ increases, the tails shrink and the probability of receiving a high profit
63The HRT copula is equivalent to a flipped-Clayton copula.
64The application of copulas is common in finance as well as in actuarial work to model and predict
the likelihood of multiple events occurring together, e.g., dips in stock prices or the occurrence of multiple
accidents.
100
draw decreases. θ is set to 1.05 in this model following empirical estimates from previous
literature. The most important term in this HRT copula is the ρ term. It parameterizes the
level of correlation between the two univariate profit distributions. As ρ→ 0, the distribution
approaches perfect correlation. As ρ→∞, the bracketed term asymptotes towards one. This
results in perfect non-correlation as we now have two separable (independent) univariate
distributions.
For this paper, the usage of a copula is crucial for one main reason. It allows me to
separately and independently control the correlation between πA and πB. Consider the
density function for the Type I distribution from Mardia [1962], which is also a bivariate
Pareto distribution.
f (πA, πB|a, b, p) =
p (p+ 1) (ab)
p+1
(bπA + aπB − ab)p+2
(3.2.2)
Analogously, the p term in (3.2.2) controls the correlation between πA and πB. However,





Because the goal is to compare differences in equilibrium revenues between the two regimes
at varying levels of correlation, we need to keep other factors, such as the mean, constant.
The HRT copula allows us to vary the correlation while holding the underlying distributions
fixed. This facilitates the analysis of the effect of imperfect correlation and only correlation
on the regime choice.
Given the profit pairs, firms are profit maximizing, i.e., the location decision is based on
the net-of-moving cost, net-of-tax profits afforded in each country. Thus, a firm originally in
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Country A will move to Country B if the following inequality holds.
πB − TBπB − c > πA − tAπA (3.2.4)
πB >




As previously mentioned, each country’s government has access to its respective domestic
and foreign tax rates, tj and Tj. Under the preferential regime, tj and Tj are allowed to
be different. Under the non-preferential regime, the two tax rates must be equal. Define
this equal, uniform tax rate as τj ≡ tj = Tj. Given these tax rates and constraints, the
objective of Country A is to maximize the sum of taxes collected from its domestic and





A (tA, TB, c, ρ) +R
foreign





A (τA, τB, c, ρ) +R
foreign
A (τA, τB, c, ρ) (3.2.7)
Countries A and B set their tax rates prior to the realization of firms’ profit pairs.
Therefore, tax rates are determined based solely on the distributional characteristics of firms.
This prevents countries from setting firm specific rates. In this single period setup, I assume
that tax rates are set simultaneously so comparisons between regimes will look at the relative
levels of pure strategy Nash Equilibrium revenues for each country. Below, I detail the
simulation parameters as well as the computational methodology.
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3.3 Simulation Setup
Recall that the central research question of this paper pertains to the effect of profit cor-
relation on equilibrium revenues under the two regimes. What we are interested in is the
comparison of the per-country equilibrium revenues when all countries are utilizing a pref-
erential regime versus when all countries are restricted to a non-preferential regime. To this
end, I simulated a numerical version of the model using MATLAB. The level of profit corre-
lation, ρ, ranged between 0.05 and 20. Recall that a smaller ρ implies that the differences in
firms’ cross-country profits are smaller, i.e., are more correlated. The marginal correlation
effect of increasing ρ decreases quickly at values of ρ greater than five. I therefore placed
more emphasis on smaller values of ρ in the cases considered.65 In regards to moving costs,
I varied c between c = {0, 1, 2, ..., 10}. c is capped at 10 due to the fact that higher moving
costs result in a significant majority of relatively immobile firms. Equilibrium tax rates in
these higher cases approached or hit 100%.
The simulations also accounted for differences in population and productivity. In the
symmetric case, both countries started with a stock of NA = NB = 10, 000 firms/draws
from the distribution. I also simulated the asymmetric cases where NA was allowed to vary
between 10,000 and 20,000 firms in increments of 2,500. The population difference between
the two countries (in thousands of firms) therefore ranged between -10 and 10. Because
more draws increases the likelihood of getting a single high profit firm, these asymmetric
populations are also a proxy for asymmetric productivities.
For each combination of ρ and population, I drew NA and NB random samples from the
HRT constructed bivariate Pareto distribution. These draws/profit pairs became the original
stocks of firms in each country within the simulated two country world. Due to the fact that
65ρ = {0.05, 0.1, 0.15, 0.2, 0.25, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 1, 1.1, 1.3, 1.5, 2, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 15, 20}
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these draws are random, it is dangerous to draw conclusions solely off of one “observation” as
sample parameters may differ significantly from population parameters. I therefore re-drew
the populations for each of the above cases under fifty different seed combinations to mitigate
small sample effects that may have led to spurious results.66 The total number of simulated
cases is therefore 66,000.
To determine the resulting equilibria, an iterated grid-search approach is utilized. See
Appendix G for a more detailed explanation of the grid-search methodology. Given an initial
starting tax rate in Country B, Country A pins down its optimal tax response. Tax rates are
constrained to be between 0 and 1, i.e., 0% and 100%, in steps or increments of 0.0001, i.e.,
0.01% points. The process then reverses and Country B now searches for the optimal rate
response to A’s previous response. This is repeated until neither country has a beneficial
deviation. Because we may be worried about identifying the local as opposed to global
optima, I re-ran this iterated grid-search from a number of different starting points. This
iterated approach identifies only stable equilibria. Unstable equilibria are ignored as they
are potentially unrealistic due to trembling hand vulnerabilities.
I run the iteration process under the preferential regime, where both countries are allowed
to set separate domestic and foreign rates, and again under the non-preferential regime when
countries are only allowed set country-specific uniform rates. This gives us four values for
each simulated case: the two equilibrium revenues for Countries A and B when both are
optimizing under the preferential regime, and the two equilibrium revenues for Countries A
and B when both are optimizing under the non-preferential regime. In total, I generated
132,000 simulated data points. Table 3.24 provides a summary of the equilibrium rates and
revenues under the two regimes.
66Thirty to thirty-five observations is the commonly accepted threshold for the application of the law of
large numbers.
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Table 3.24: Summary Statistics
MIN MAX MEAN STD
t 4.7363% 100% 72.30804% 20.56718%
T 4.8163% 99.995% 71.85129% 19.45502%
τ 5.6765% 99.86% 71.34218% 20.81503%
Pref Rev 4,656.376 6,118,639 111,278.5 134,890.6
Non-Pref Rev 4,609.917 6,103,578 107,657.6 133,992.1
Percent Corr. 6.14828% 5337.793% 132.9909% 1969.488%
Level Corr. 0.4184916 354.1895 7.630336 8.699364
Kendall’s Tau 0.0058533 0.9110343 0.3776516 0.2650142
3.4 Results
3.4.1 Measuring Profit Correlation
To quantify the level of profit correlation, I use three different measures: Kendall’s Tau,
level deviation, and percent deviation. Table 3.24 provides descriptive statistics on these
measures which are discussed below.
Kendall’s Tau is a measure of rank correlation, i.e., how close the πA and πB are in
regards to their relative positions within each univariate distribution. It is therefore bounded
between -1 and 1. A Tau of 1 and -1 implies perfect positive and negative rank correlation,
respectively. A Tau of zero implies rank independence. For example, if the profits are such
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that πA ∈ {1, 2} and πB ∈ {11, 12} then a profit pair of (1, 11) and (2, 12) would imply a
Tau of 1. Because these simulations focus solely on positive dependencies, Kendall’s Tau is
strictly positive within the sample.
In the context of copulas, Kendall’s Tau is a copula-specific function of the ρ term.
Importantly, it is independent of the marginals, i.e., the u terms from (3.2.1). In the HRT
copula, Kendall’s Tau is equal to 1/ (2ρ+ 1). As ρ ranges between 0.05 and 20 in the
simulations, the sample Taus in Table 3.24 line up very closely to the true Taus. Using
Spearman’s Rho produces similar results. As the marginal, univariate distributions are both
Pareto distributions with an identical lower bound set at π = 1, rank correlation should
produce similar results to level measures of correlation. However, this is dependent on having
a large sample size. Therefore, two alternative measures of correlation are constructed for
the analysis - level deviation and percent deviation.
As opposed to measuring the rank correlation, the level deviation between profits within
each profit pair looks at the magnitude of differences between cross-country profits. I define
the level deviation as the sample average of the absolute value of the differences in each profit






|πiA − πiB| (3.4.1)
Recall from the previous example that the two profit pairs (1, 11) and (2, 12) have a rank
correlation of 1, i.e., we have perfect positive correlation. However, the level deviation is
equal to ten because the profit difference is ten in both pairs. A level deviation of zero there-
fore implies that the cross-country profits for each firm are equal, i.e., perfectly, one-to-one
correlated. Higher level deviation values imply that the profits are on average further apart.
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Notice that level deviation does not distinguish between positive and negative correlations.
Because firms care about profit and not rank, this may be a more appropriate measure,
irregardless of sample size.
To account for proportional effects, I also consider percent deviation. This is calculated by
averaging the percentage cross-country profit differences as a fraction of πA or πB, depending









Intuitively, this is meant to capture the fact that a profit difference of ten should imply
less correlation between πA and πB when the baseline profit is 20 versus 20,000. Similar to
level deviation, a percent deviation of zero implies that the profits are equal for every pair
while higher percent deviation implies less proportional correlation. Overall, notice that with
Kendall’s Tau, a higher Tau is associated with greater correlation. Conversely, a higher level
and percent deviation is associated with less correlation.
In the analysis, the three measures of correlation are further categorized to be own or
other correlation to represent profit correlation in one’s own country versus the correlation
in the other country.
3.4.2 Rates and Revenue
To analyze and summarize the data, OLS regressions are utilized. These regressions are run
on samples split up based on whether PopDiff > 0 or PopDiff ≤ 0, i.e., for the more and
weakly less populous countries, respectively. There is no uncertainty in the samples aside
from the randomness generated by the different seeds. For all regressions, seed dummies,
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seedi ∈ {1, 2, ..., 50}, as well as country dummies are included as controls but omitted from
the regression results. Likewise, seed-country interactions are also included and omitted.
Table 3.25 presents the regression results on the effects of own and other percent devi-
ation/correlation, population difference, and moving costs on the equilibrium rates. Under
the preferential regime, domestic rates increase as both own or other percent deviation in-
crease, i.e., when correlation decreases. A decrease in own correlation generates both greater
incentives and dis-incentives for firm movement because πA− πB may become more positive
or negative. As long as decreases in correlation do not skew in a specific direction, changes
to the likelihood of firm movement should, on average, balance out. Therefore, domestic
rates should, at worst, stay relatively constant if not increase under the presence of positive
moving costs. A decrease in other correlation acts in a similar fashion.
For more (less) populous countries, the effect of PopDiff is negative (positive). Theory
suggests that changes in population should not affect the preferential rates if the changes
are proportional across all productivities - Niu [2013b], Wilson and Mongrain [forthcoming].
Because population also affects the range of firm profits in these simulations, the coefficients
on PopDiff are very small in magnitude and essentially equal to zero. Moving costs increase
domestic rates because they reduce the benefits of moving for all firms. In regards to the
uniform tax rate under the non-preferential regime, decreases in correlation, moving costs,
and population differences all increase the uniform rate. Likewise, Table 3.26 presents re-
gression results pertaining to the effects of these factors on the equilibrium revenues under
the two regimes.
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Table 3.25: Effects on the Three Equilibrium Rates
(Pop Diff ? 0) Domestic (>) Domestic (<=) Foreign (>) Foreign (<=) Uniform (>) Uniform (<=)
Own Percent 0.0264*** 0.0512*** 0.0211*** 0.0404*** 0.0266*** 0.0505***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Oth Percent 0.0476*** 0.0323*** 0.0454*** 0.0271*** 0.0508*** 0.0322***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Pop Diff -0.0011*** 0.0010*** -0.0005** 0.0005*** 0.0012*** 0.0025***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C 0.0185*** 0.0118*** 0.0094*** 0.0163*** 0.0135*** 0.0114***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.5931*** 0.6203*** 0.5314*** 0.4886*** 0.5285*** 0.5361***
(0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.009) (0.005) (0.010)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.433 0.487 0.405 0.402 0.405 0.425
This table shows regressions results on the three equilibrium rates: the domestic and foreign rates under
the preferential regime, and the uniform rate under the non-preferential regime. The regressions are divided
between samples where the population difference is greater than zero and less than or equal to zero. Not
shown are seed, country, and seed-country interaction terms included in each regression. Using alternate
correlation parameters do not substantively change any coefficients. Columns are separated for larger and
weakly smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.26: Effects on the Two Equilibrium Revenues
(Pop Diff ? 0) Pref. Rev (>) Pref. Rev (<=) Non-Pref. Rev (>) Non-Pref. Rev (<=)
Own Percent 4,679.0300*** -20,864.6720*** 4,283.3778*** -21,980.0830***
(80.627) (211.108) (82.533) (211.525)
Oth Percent 21,818.8879*** 73,914.1774*** 21,719.6510*** 73,324.9854***
(100.109) (178.586) (102.475) (178.939)
Pop Diff 5,249.1034*** -4,056.3740*** 5,220.0619*** -4,040.1157***
(54.872) (95.604) (56.168) (95.793)
C 1,395.3293*** 283.4013*** 952.7234*** -284.5414***
(48.475) (97.527) (49.620) (97.720)
Constant 40,468.4348*** 24,337.1607*** 38,920.5619*** 26,497.4752***
(1,167.473) (5,369.959) (1,195.058) (5,380.581)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.669 0.729 0.654 0.724
This table shows regressions results on the two equilibrium revenues. The regressions are
divided between samples where the population difference is greater than zero and less than or
equal to zero. Not shown are seed, country, and seed-country interaction terms. Columns are
separated for larger and weakly smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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C = 1 939.769***
(119.180)
C = 2 2,074.047***
(119.180)
C = 3 2,974.695***
(119.180)
C = 4 3,599.087***
(119.180)
C = 5 3,984.466***
(119.180)
C = 6 4,523.552***
(119.180)
C = 7 4,863.480***
(119.180)
C = 8 5,002.156***
(119.180)
C = 9 5,183.517***
(119.180)




Not shown are seed, country,
seed-country interaction terms,
and constant.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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3.4.3 Revenue Gap
Following Niu [2013b] this paper has two primary, dependent variables of interest. The
first variable is the revenue gap which I define as the difference in equilibrium revenues
generated by the preferential and non-preferential regimes. A positive revenue gap implies
that the preferential regime is revenue-dominant while a negative revenue gap implies that
the non-preferential regime is revenue-dominant. The second variable is the revenue gap in
percentages. It is the revenue gap as a fraction of the non-preferential revenue. Because
revenue levels may inherently increase or decrease given changes to other parameters, the
percentage revenue gap scales these effects.
As with before, I use OLS regressions to quantify effects on the revenue gap. On the right
hand side, the main independent variables of interest are the three correlation measures.
Controls used in the regressions include the difference in population, moving costs, seed and
country dummies, and seed-country interactions. Quadratic and cubic moving cost terms
are included in the regressions to reflect non-linearities as evidenced by Table 3.27. With a
moving cost of zero as the baseline, we see that the differential effect of higher moving costs
is initially increasing, peaks around c = 2, and then diminishes at higher costs. Adding a
quartic moving cost term results in insignificant coefficients on both the quartic and cubic
terms.
Regressing the revenue gap on own and other correlation suggests that on average,
decreasing correlation results in greater revenue. This implies that higher OwnPercent,
higher OwnLevel, and lower OwnKendall values make the preferential regime more revenue-
dominant. Similar to moving costs, this effect is non-linear. Tables 3.28 and 3.29 present
regressions that include splines for the three correlation measures. F-tests on the equality of
the spline coefficients allow us to strongly reject the null hypothesis. As is evident, the
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Table 3.28: Revenue Gaps with Splines
(Pop Diff ? 0) Percent (>) Percent (<=) Level (>) Level (<=) Kendall (>) Kendall (<=)
Own - 1 -136,444*** -137,173*** -3,299*** -1,525*** 45,335*** 45,847***
(29,428.471) (38,546.407) (310.571) (444.128) (8,801.905) (11,722.266)
Own - 2 -51,945*** -19,699** 448*** 354** -46,742*** 15,591
(7,298.290) (9,367.195) (112.251) (158.015) (9,051.500) (11,937.049)
Own - 3 3,339 -5,795* 1,662*** 1,399*** -729 54,132***
(2,285.648) (3,022.014) (66.480) (92.476) (10,126.511) (13,315.871)
Own - 4 2,691*** -269 882*** 755*** 24,910* 19,405
(317.274) (522.517) (43.932) (66.006) (12,976.968) (17,214.775)
Own - 5 94*** 668*** 11** 222*** -143,540*** 276,231***
(15.961) (31.261) (4.628) (17.421) (24,920.701) (32,920.898)
Oth - 1 129,910*** 139,666*** 691** 165 -90,765*** -170,848***
(29,440.592) (38,532.799) (316.760) (439.619) (8,898.503) (11,641.942)
Oth - 2 45,861*** 12,759 -2,147*** -2,032*** 31,975*** -31,215***
(7,311.192) (9,360.529) (111.731) (158.762) (9,068.809) (11,916.840)
Oth - 3 4,654** 10,862*** -279*** -326*** -12,250 -62,422***
(2,307.743) (3,002.236) (64.037) (93.526) (10,030.830) (13,408.943)
Oth - 4 -480 1,678*** -394*** -317*** -17,553 -11,169
(359.419) (506.517) (49.814) (60.419) (12,946.797) (17,246.836)
Oth - 5 -318*** 295*** -126*** 36*** 183,608*** -247,901***
(21.601) (23.917) (13.203) (5.872) (24,870.955) (32,968.696)
Pop Diff 35*** -19* 19** -35*** 37*** -20*
(9.172) (10.978) (9.218) (11.021) (9.050) (10.926)
C 1,134*** 1,329*** 1,134*** 1,329*** 1,134*** 1,329***
(68.757) (95.020) (68.773) (94.623) (67.877) (94.303)
C Sq -102*** -92*** -102*** -92*** -102*** -92***
(16.468) (22.757) (16.471) (22.662) (16.257) (22.586)
C Cb 4*** 2 4*** 2 4*** 2
(1.081) (1.493) (1.081) (1.487) (1.067) (1.482)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.400 0.169 0.266 0.176 0.285 0.182
The knots for own percent, level, and Kendall given PopDiff > 0 are located at [0.268,0.615,0.986,2.346],
[2.497,5.542,8.162,11.688], and [0.096,0.280,0.416,0.665]. Knots for other correlations are located at
[0.269,0.618,0.985,2.279], [2.451,5.505,8.293,11.486], and [0.268,0.615,0.986,2.346]. Knots when PopDiff
is less than or equal to zero are almost identical. Not shown are seed, country, seed-country indicators,
and constants. Columns are separated for larger and weakly smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.29: Revenue Gap in %’s with Splines
(Pop Diff ? 0) Percent (>) Percent (<=) Level (>) Level (<=) Kendall (>) Kendall (<=)
Own - 1 -2.4469*** -1.7691*** -0.0945*** -0.0240*** 0.2154 0.5111***
(0.568) (0.553) (0.006) (0.006) (0.168) (0.166)
Own - 2 -0.5893*** -0.1186 0.0014 -0.0012 -0.4752*** 0.0356
(0.140) (0.134) (0.002) (0.002) (0.173) (0.169)
Own - 3 0.0350 -0.1169*** 0.0170*** 0.0179*** -0.1428 0.4241**
(0.044) (0.043) (0.001) (0.001) (0.194) (0.188)
Own - 4 0.0141** -0.0137* 0.0050*** 0.0063*** 0.3363 -0.4098*
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.248) (0.243)
Own - 5 0.0011*** 0.0028*** 0.0001 0.0026*** -2.9332*** 4.1929***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.476) (0.465)
Oth - 1 2.0961*** 1.5059*** 0.0193*** -0.0465*** -0.4868*** -1.3667***
(0.568) (0.553) (0.006) (0.006) (0.170) (0.165)
Oth - 2 0.4885*** -0.0355 -0.0308*** -0.0364*** 0.3972** -0.1294
(0.141) (0.134) (0.002) (0.002) (0.173) (0.168)
Oth - 3 0.0267 0.1596*** -0.0007 -0.0002 0.0618 -0.4942***
(0.044) (0.043) (0.001) (0.001) (0.192) (0.190)
Oth - 4 -0.0039 0.0218*** -0.0053*** -0.0066*** -0.2145 0.5973**
(0.007) (0.007) (0.001) (0.001) (0.247) (0.244)
Oth - 5 -0.0024*** -0.0012*** -0.0009*** -0.0004*** 4.0176*** -3.0631***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.475) (0.466)
Pop Diff -0.0023*** 0.0016*** -0.0023*** 0.0012*** -0.0023*** 0.0016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C 0.0212*** 0.0269*** 0.0212*** 0.0269*** 0.0212*** 0.0269***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
C Sq -0.0026*** -0.0032*** -0.0026*** -0.0032*** -0.0026*** -0.0032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C Cb 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.328 0.302 0.325 0.301 0.359 0.333
The knots are in the same locations as in the previous regressions. Not shown are seed, country,
seed-country indicators, and constants. Columns are separated for larger and weakly smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.30: Revenue Gaps with Cubics
(Pop Diff ? 0) Percent (>) Percent (<=) Level (>) Level (<=) Kendall (>) Kendall (<=)
Own 2,106.09*** 288.89** 668.26*** -1,706.09*** 40,495.07*** 81,009.17***
(78.315) (126.522) (13.382) (38.849) (10,233.503) (13,154.163)
Own Sq -83.08*** 200.73*** -4.81*** 134.82*** -101,731.53*** -231,044.19***
(5.137) (12.760) (0.122) (2.324) (29,290.873) (38,075.761)
Own Cb 0.91*** -6.56*** 0.01*** -2.17*** 55,817.09* 293,762.26***
(0.080) (0.316) (0.000) (0.039) (30,431.123) (39,467.478)
Oth -1,633.61*** 889.16*** -1,935.87*** 357.23*** -96,910.63*** -178,698.71***
(96.883) (104.018) (29.598) (17.868) (10,196.780) (13,185.445)
Oth Sq 137.61*** 11.75* 105.88*** -1.15*** 209,060.59*** 433,534.29***
(9.539) (6.966) (1.795) (0.175) (29,111.900) (38,231.318)
Oth Cb -3.07*** -0.52*** -1.60*** 0.00* -106,655.72*** -410,420.31***
(0.235) (0.110) (0.031) (0.000) (30,307.192) (39,574.669)
Pop Diff 33.82*** -20.14* 18.05* -6.56 37.14*** -19.99*
(10.097) (11.275) (9.864) (11.296) (9.338) (11.017)
C 1,134.43*** 1,329.48*** 1,134.43*** 1,329.48*** 1,134.43*** 1,329.48***
(75.717) (97.625) (73.931) (97.742) (70.042) (95.093)
C Sq -102.39*** -92.23*** -102.39*** -92.23*** -102.39*** -92.23***
(18.134) (23.381) (17.707) (23.410) (16.775) (22.775)
C Cb 3.58*** 1.73 3.58*** 1.73 3.58*** 1.73
(1.190) (1.534) (1.162) (1.536) (1.101) (1.495)
Constant 382.98* -3,097.56*** 4,243.21*** 1,260.56* 6,902.04*** 9,171.78***
(226.340) (640.151) (228.490) (645.532) (220.688) (630.195)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.111 0.123 0.152 0.121 0.239 0.168
Not shown are seed, country, and seed-country indicators. Columns are separated for larger and weakly
smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 3.31: Revenue Gap in %’s with Cubics
(Pop Diff ? 0) Percent (>) Percent (<=) Level (>) Level (<=) Kendall (>) Kendall (<=)
Own 0.017752*** -0.037069*** 0.006958*** -0.041429*** -0.0242 0.7586***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.001) (0.197) (0.190)
Own Sq -0.000476*** 0.005274*** -0.000051*** 0.002550*** 0.7046 -3.0994***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.565) (0.550)
Own Cb 0.000003** -0.000135*** 0.000000*** -0.000038*** -1.3064** 3.8137***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.587) (0.571)
Oth -0.052847*** 0.004722*** -0.041063*** 0.002948*** -0.5090*** -1.7153***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) (0.197) (0.191)
Oth Sq 0.004938*** 0.000149 0.002140*** -0.000022*** 0.3936 5.2301***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.562) (0.553)
Oth Cb -0.000111*** -0.000005*** -0.000031*** 0.000000*** 0.9287 -4.8789***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.585) (0.572)
Pop Diff -0.002344*** 0.001562*** -0.002494*** 0.001627*** -0.0023*** 0.0016***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C 0.021169*** 0.026912*** 0.021169*** 0.026912*** 0.0212*** 0.0269***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
C Sq -0.002643*** -0.003168*** -0.002643*** -0.003168*** -0.0026*** -0.0032***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
C Cb 0.000111*** 0.000128*** 0.000111*** 0.000128*** 0.0001*** 0.0001***
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Constant 0.071463*** 0.026892*** 0.158282*** 0.128791*** 0.0643*** 0.0577***
(0.004) (0.010) (0.004) (0.009) (0.004) (0.009)
Observations 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200 52,800 79,200
R-squared 0.068 0.062 0.167 0.143 0.218 0.193
Not shown are seed, country, and seed-country indicators. Columns are separated for larger and weakly
smaller countries.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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coefficients differ in both magnitude and occasionally in sign. We can also see the non-
linearity when using a double-residual regression procedure - not shown in the paper. A
kernel fit on the residuals seems to suggest that the trend is at most cubic.
The preferred specification therefore includes quadratic and cubic terms. Coefficients
are given in Tables 3.30 and 3.31. Figures 3.4.1 - 3.4.6 graphically depict the estimated
effects of the three correlation measures on the revenue gap in levels and percentages. A
correlation value of zero is deceptive because the polynomial forces the effect to be zero
when the dependent variable equals zero. However, it is actually hidden in the constant
term. In any, the focus of the tables and figures is on the marginal effects of own and other
deviation/correlation, i.e., the slope, rather than the level effects.
In general, the revenue gap effects under percent and level deviations are similar, as
evidenced by Figures 3.4.1 through 3.4.4. As own deviation increases, moving from left to
right in the graphs, revenue gaps for larger countries increase although at a decreasing rate.
The effects appear fairly close to being quadratic as is indicated by the relatively small cubic
coefficients on own correlation. For smaller countries, the effects of decreasing own correlation
is highly cubic and is actually negative at higher correlations. Comparatively, decreasing own
correlation creates much stronger pro-preferential regime effects for countries with greater
relative population. Decreasing other correlation almost always has a negative impact on
the revenue difference for larger countries. At high levels of correlation, small decreases in
correlation decrease the revenue difference. At lower levels of correlations, this flips. For
smaller countries, decreasing correlation unambiguously increases the revenue difference.
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Figure 3.4.1: Percent Correlation and the Rev Gap
Figure 3.4.2: Percent Correlation and the Rev Gap in %
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Figure 3.4.3: Level Correlation and the Rev Gap
Figure 3.4.4: Level Correlation and the Rev Gap in %
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Figure 3.4.5: Kendall’s Tau and the Rev Gap
Figure 3.4.6: Kendall’s Tau and the Rev Gap in %
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Figures 3.4.5 and 3.4.6 graphically depict results from the Kendall’s Tau correlation
regressions. Recall that less correlation corresponds with moving from right to left on the
graphs, i.e., Kendall’s Tau decreases from 1 to 0. Decreasing own correlation tends to increase
(decrease) the revenue gap for more (less) populous countries. The overall effects, however,
are negative and positive, respectively. Decreasing other correlation has the opposite effect.
The overall effect is positive for larger countries but decreases the revenue gap as correlation
decreases. The overall effect is negative for less populous countries but increases the revenue
gap as correlation decreases. The graphs are much smoother under Kendall’s Tau correlation
due to the direct relationship between ρ and Kendall’s Tau.
If we take own and other correlations to be equal, then the combined effects of correlation
are given by Figures 3.5.1 - 3.5.3. In these figures, the coefficients are summed and describe
the effect of correlation if both own and other levels move together. For joint movements
in own and other correlation, decreases in correlation increase revenue gaps on average and
make the preferential regime more likely to be revenue-dominant.
3.5 Conclusion
This paper addressed the preferential/non-preferential question by analyzing the impact of
profit correlation on the revenue-optimal regime choice. While Niu [2013b] only looked at
perfect correlation and perfect non-correlation, this paper extended the model to encompass
imperfect profit correlation while incorporating three aspects from the international litera-
ture. This updated, stochastic model is more realistic as it uses a Pareto distribution to
represent firms as well as including randomness. Niu [2013b] found that the preferential
regime was revenue-dominant in cases of asymmetry under perfectly non-correlated profits.
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Under perfectly correlated profits, the preferential regime was never revenue-dominant. How-
ever, it was unclear as to the nature of the effect in between the two extreme correlations.
The effect of profit correlation may be smooth or it could have been discontinuous.
Overall, results under the three measures of deviation/correlation are fairly consistent so
I will focus on percent deviation. In general, changes in own versus other percent deviation
have opposite trends. For a larger country, the effect of own percent deviation is initially
negative at high levels of correlation but becomes positive at lower levels of correlation. This
trend flips for other percent deviation. Own correlation has a greater, more positive effect
on the revenue gap than other correlation. For a smaller country, these trends are the same
except that other correlation is now stronger than own correlation. This makes sense as
smaller countries’ biggest gains from trade come via the attraction of foreign firms. If profit
correlation in the larger country decreases, this results in a bigger profit differential, i.e.,
firms become more polarized towards either staying or moving. The smaller country can
then exploit this larger wedge with a higher foreign tax.
Intuitively, less correlation decreases the negative effects of tax competition because the
two tax bases become more segmented. In comparing the preferential to the non-preferential
regime, the main drawback was the negative revenue effects of increased competition. All
else being equal, setting specific tax rates for each base should generate greater revenue. Less
competition, stemming from a decrease in the relative proportion of marginal, tax sensitive
firms, therefore decreases the negative competition effect and makes preferential taxation
revenue-dominant. In general, the simulations showed that decreases in profit correlation
do in fact tend to increase the revenue gap. This implies that countries with lower levels of
profit correlation would generate more per-country revenues if both used preferential regimes.
Conversely, countries with low levels of profit correlation would generate more per-country
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revenues if both used non-preferential regimes.
In addition, the simulations showed that there were instances under high levels of profit
correlation and zero moving costs where the preferential regime was revenue dominant. This
result runs counter to the perfect mobility result from Niu [2013b] in which the revenue
gap was equal to zero for c = 0. It is likely that this disparity is caused by the presence
of randomness in these simulations. The Niu [2013b] result required that the underlying
distributions be identical. While the distributions are identical in this paper, randomness
was introduced due to the sampling and relatively small number of draws. For larger samples,
this zero moving cost result may still apply.
The results of this paper suggest that in addition to looking at asymmetries in productiv-
ity and population, the degree of profit correlation is also an important factor in determining
the revenue-optimal, bilateral regime choice. This has significant policy implications if we
assume that among EU and OECD countries, country pairings are likely to have higher
degrees of profit correlation than pairings between EU and developing countries. Addition-
ally, the model also speaks towards the interplay between regime choice and ease of profit
shifting. Notice that profit correlation can be interpreted as a proxy for the costliness of
profit shifting between multinationals. If profit shifting was costless, then differences in the
profitability of a firm across different countries would be irrelevant. Profits could simply be
transferred to another jurisdiction so effectively, profits in all countries are the same. This is
equivalent to assuming perfect profit correlation. As profit shifting becomes costlier, profit
correlation would then decrease as location now plays a larger role in determining the level
of gross profits. The results therefore suggest that preferential tax regimes are less likely to
be revenue-dominant when multinational firms’ abilities to profit shift are high.
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Figure 3.5.1: Joint Own/Other Percent Correlation and the Rev Gap
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Figure 3.5.2: Joint Own/Other Level Correlation and the Rev Gap
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Households select where they want to purchase the good and whether or not to redeem
by maximizing the total net benefit, U . For household i residing in city j, the total net
benefit of purchasing in city k and not redeeming is given by:
UNRij =

Vi − (1 + τInd) pk − (|k − j|) cTi if k = {1, 2}
Vi − (1 + τMich) pk − 10− (|k − j|) cTi if k = {3, 4}
(A1)
Only purchases made in Michigan, i.e., Cities 3 and 4, are subject to the additional
deposit. If the household chooses to redeem, Uij increases by the ten cent deposit but
decreases by the hassle cost of redemption. I refer to this as the net redemption value
10 − cRi . By assumption, the travel cost associated with redemption is equal to zero for
Michigan households. Michiganders will therefore choose to redeem if the net redemption
value is weakly positive. The proportion of the Michigan population that redeems is given by
pr(cRi ≤ 10) = FR(10). For Indiana households, redemption results in an additional travel
cost unless the household is already purchasing in Michigan. Unless the household is already


















if k = {3, 4}
(A2)
In the simulations, I assumed a θ of 1.01 where θ is defined as the ratio of cT,purchases to
cT,redemptions. This differentiated between the travel cost incurred when a household purchases
in another city versus the travel cost incurred for redemptions. More importantly, it allowed
households to break ties between a number of different choices. In regards to the previous
total net benefit equations, assume that cT is now the travel cost associated with redeeming.
The (|k − j|) cTi term in (A1) is multiplied by θ to reflect travel costs for purchases. Equation
(A2) remains unchanged.
For firms/cities, the goal is to maximize profits. Because costs are assumed to be zero
this is equivalent to maximizing revenues. In the simulations, I first calculate the total net
benefits of all households for each of the eight purchase-redemption combinations given prices
in the four cities. Households select the option with the highest positive value; households
can choose to not purchase the good. To calculate revenues in each city, I multiply the total
number of households purchasing in city j by pj. Cities optimize by setting the price that




Sampling wise, I first identified those cities within 20 miles of the Michigan border. This
created a list of approximately 40 cities between the three states. For each of these border
cities, I had a target goal of 15 retail observations between the different types of retailers with
an emphasis on supermarkets, grocery stores, and liquor stores as well as retailers located
within five miles of the border. However, I was only able to do so in less than ten of the
border cities due to the fact the large majority these border cities did not have enough
population to have such retail coverage. For cities located between 20 and 50 miles from
the border, I had a target goal of five retail observations. Cities further than 50 miles had a
target of only one or two observations. The list of retailers was collected using Google Maps’
spatial search function with the search terms “grocery”, “beer”, and “pharmacy”.
During the actual collection of prices, there was a significant amount of attrition. Nearly
half of the retailers contacted via phone either did not answer (no longer in business, busy,
not present) or refused to participate (company/store policy, busy, fear of competition). In
these cases, I would re-sample and try to contact another store. I also collected pricing data
in-person. Three trips were taken which focused heavily on the border regions near Toledo,
Ohio and South Bend, Indiana. These trips were also used to fill in attrition gaps in smaller
towns and cities near the border. Attrition was also present during my in-person visits (no
longer in business, missing/unknown prices, refusal to participate).
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APPENDIX C
Proof of t ≥ τ ≥ T
Recall that base b is assumed to be less responsive to tax rate changes than base B. This
implies that for any t = T , εbt is weakly greater, i.e., less negative, than ε
B
T . From (2.2.2) and
(2.2.3), we know that the optimal preferential rates occur when both bases are unit elastic.
Therefore, it must be true that a weakly higher rate is needed to make εbt unit elastic. At
the optimum rates, it must be that t ≥ T .
Under the non-preferential regime, (2.2.4) must hold at the revenue maximizing uniform
rate. Because b and B are positive, it must be that (1 + εbτ ) and −(1 + εBτ ) are of the same
sign. Alternatively, both bases could be unit elastic at the same rate but this cannot be true
given our assumption. Therefore, it must be that εbτ ≥ −1 ≥ εBτ or εbτ ≤ −1 ≤ εBτ . Due to
the fact that εbτ is weakly greater than ε
B
τ by assumption, it must be that ε
b
τ ≥ −1 ≥ εBτ is
true under the non-preferential regime.
Under the preferential regime, we know that at the revenue maximizing rates both elas-
ticities are unit elastic such that t ≥ T . Under the non-preferential regime, we know that at
the revenue maximizing uniform rate εbτ ≥ −1 ≥ εBτ . Thus, the uniform rate must be less
than t but greater than T which implies that t > τ > T . In general, t ≥ τ ≥ T will be
true. Both bases could be equally responsive in which case the rates are equal. However,
this condition requires that the revenue functions are quasi-concave with respect to the tax
rate. If the revenue function has multiple peaks, then more than one tax rate would generate
the same elasticity and this condition may fail.
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APPENDIX D
Optimal Rates Under the Preferential Regime
From (2.3.2) and (2.3.3), define φDj (tj, Tk, c, α) and φ
F
j (Tj, tk, c, α) to be the upper bounds
on the integrals over πk. Taking the derivative of Rj with respect to tj and Tj gives us
t∗j(Tk, fj, c, α) and T
∗
j (tk, fk, c, α). This is equivalent to maximizing domestic and foreign




































Under the preferential regime, the optimum tax rates are independent of country size. In-
tuitively, N should not affect the tax rate because the marginal increases in revenue and
decreases in base are both scaled up by N . As long as the increase in firm population is
proportional across all firm productivities, it should not have any effect. Alternatively, we













































Optimal Rates Under the Non-Preferential Regime



































Under the non-preferential regime, the optimum uniform tax rate does depend on the size
of the countries. As opposed to the case of the preferential regime where a single country’s
domestic and foreign bases were independent of each other, the uniform tax rate now affects
both bases simultaneously. An increase in τj causes a marginal increase in revenue from
existing domestic and foreign firms, and a marginal decrease in revenue from those leaving
the two bases. The domestic base is scaled by the Nj term while the foreign base is scaled by
the Nk term. Notice, however, that if both Nj and Nk change proportionally, τj is unaffected.
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APPENDIX F
Ch. II Numerical Details
I use MATLAB to analyze my numerical model. The basic outline is listed below.
1. Calculate Country A’s revenue function taking as given the tax rates of Country B.
2. Find the argmax(es) of the revenue function.
3. Repeat steps 1 and 2 for each possible combination of Country B’s tax rates (tB,TB)
to complete Country A’s best response function.
4. Repeat steps 1 - 3 for Country B’s best response function.
5. Identify pure strategy equilibrium/equilibria by searching for corresponding entries in
the two best responses.
From 2.3.1, I can explicitly write down the equations for the population of firms that are
moving or not moving as an integral over the distribution of firms’ profits. Multiplying the
densities by the profit times the tax rates gives me the domestic/foreign revenues for a given
country. Because firms are distributed uniformly the density is straightforward. However,
the general equation is highly piece-wise so a number of conditional statements are needed
to correctly calculate the revenue under different sets of parameters. A’s revenue function
(matrix), taking as given B’s current tax rates, is calculated by running through A’s revenue
equations for each possible tax rate. Tax rate(s) that maximize revenue given B’s current
tax rates are recorded as best responses. The loop then repeats but for the next combination
of B’s tax rates. If the countries are symmetric, then A’s and B’s best response functions
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(matrices) are identical. If the countries are asymmetric, then I repeat this process under the
new set of parameters where A and B are reversed. Pure strategy equilibria are calculated
by looking for intersection(s) in the best response functions. It is possible to use other,
numerically faster methods to identify the equilibria. However, corner solutions as well as
multiple equilibria are of particular concern in this literature and type of model. As such, I
felt it more appropriate to identify the entire range of equilibria using a more rudimentary
but thorough method.
To calculate the TNP under each equilibrium, the tax rates are plugged back into the
previous revenue equations. Firms move according to the equilibrium tax rates but the
amount of revenue collected from each firm is set to one, i.e., tax collection is set at 100%, to
capture the profits of all firms. The moving cost is deducted from the profits of those foreign
firms. The TNP loss is calculated by comparing the TNP under each equilibrium against
the TNP when tax rates are set to zero. Given the computing time required, the majority of
the programs are run on the University of Michigan CAC NYX/FLUX computing cluster.
For the main simulations, π̄j = {1, 1.25, 1.5, 1.75, 2} and likewise for the population
multipliers Nj. For moving costs and moving cost deductibility, I consider the values
c = {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3} and α = {0, 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, 1}. Every combination of productivity, pop-
ulation, moving cost, and cost deductibility is then considered in this range of parameter
values. For the more specific productivity and population asymmetry graphs shown in Fig-
ures 2.4.5 - 2.4.7, I simulate cases for π̄ and N between 1 and 100 in smaller increments to
capture specifically targeted effects.
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APPENDIX G
Ch. III Numerical Details
To generate the samples from the bivariate HRT, I first created two vectors of random
numbers drawn uniformly between 0 and 1. The first vector houses the CDF values on the
πhome marginal distribution. Inverting the Pareto marginal allowed me to back out the
corresponding πhome value that would have generated the corresponding CDF value. The
second vector houses the conditional CDF values, i.e., Pr(πabroad|πhome). Because the
HRT copula and marginals are invertible, this allowed me to back out the second profit term
conditional on the first, for different values of ρ and other parameters. The same process
was then repeated from the perspective of the other country.
The grid-search begins by arbitrarily choosing a starting tax rate for the other country
- assume that this is Country B. Country A proceeds to narrow down the best response
by going through three meshes of increasing fineness: 0.05 (5%), 0.001 (0.1%), and 0.0001
(0.01%). At each mesh, Country A finds the tax rate that maximizes revenue. It then
narrows the scope of possible rates to be ± the fineness step and repeats the search at the
next level of fineness. After Country A nails down the optimal response, Country B repeats
this process taking as given A’s response. This continues until an equilibrium is reached.
In cases where a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium was not found, an equilibrium loop was
identified, i.e., a closed cycle of reaction-counter-reaction. The magnitude of different rates
within these loops were typically ±0.01%. As such, the average of the rates within these
loops were used to approximate a pure strategy equilibrium. In these simulations, this is
caused by the relatively small number of draws per country. Higher numbers of firms would
alleviate this issue but at the cost of much greater computing needs.
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